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I.  INTRODUCTION 
United States legal education needs to change.  Simply stated, there is a 
shrinking demand for the product we offer.1  At the vast majority of 
American Bar Association (ABA)-accredited law schools, a large percentage 
of graduates are not obtaining full-time, permanent employment as 
practicing lawyers.2  This situation is partially driven by lawyer 
overproduction—for the last several decades, the number of law schools and 
law students has steadily expanded.3  At the same time, demand for 
 *  Professor of Law and Director of the Center on the Global Legal Profession, Indiana 
University Maurer School of Law.  This essay is part of Pepperdine Law Review’s April 20, 2012 
The Lawyer of the Future symposium, exploring the role of the lawyer in American society—past, 
present, and future. 
 1.  Lincoln Caplan, Editorial, An Existential Crisis for Law Schools, N.Y. Times, July 15, 2012, 
at SR10, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/15/opinion/sunday/an-existential-crisis-for-
law-schools.html?smid=pl-share (Lincoln Caplan, a member of the N.Y. Times Editorial Board who 
writes about legal affairs, stated that, “A huge number of new graduates, if lucky enough to find 
work, will not be employed in legal jobs that require passing the bar.”). 
 2.  Id.  
 3.  The number of ABA-accredited law schools has increased from 163 in 1975 to 201 in 2011.  
See Enrollment and Degrees Awarded: 1963–2011 Academic Years, A.B.A., 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_and_admissions_to_th
e_bar/statistics/enrollment_degrees_awarded.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited Nov. 9, 2012).  Based 
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traditional legal services has flattened and is now on the decline.4  There are 
multiple reasons for shrinking demand, including legal process outsourcing, 
more efficient work processes and staffing methods, automation, and flat or 
declining real incomes of lower and middle class citizens.5  Clients are also 
refusing to bear the training costs of junior-level lawyers—and with a 
plentitude of skilled senior lawyers who are unable or unwilling to retire, 
there is simply no need.6  As discussed herein, these changes are structural 
rather than cyclical.7  United States legal education exists in the present form 
only because of a system of federal student loans that is unsustainable, both 
financially and politically.8 
This essay may look like a conventional law review article, but it is not.  
It is a strategy memo addressed to my fellow legal educators on how to 
respond to a profoundly serious business problem.  The demand for our core 
product—traditionally educated law school graduates—is collapsing.9  The 
legal market itself is undergoing a dramatic transformation.10  On the most 
basic level, it is clear that law schools must become more attuned to legal 
employers—we need professional employment for our graduates to keep the 
doors open.  Yet, legal employers are struggling to adapt to an environment 
in which clients are increasingly opting for technology and process-driven 
legal solutions that require less input from traditionally trained lawyers.  
Creating more “practice ready” graduates will help some law schools more 
effectively place their graduates in the finite—and likely shrinking—market 
for traditional entry level legal jobs.  Yet, this strategy cannot work for all 
schools. 
Stated bluntly, the legal profession is becoming a subset of a larger legal 
industry that is increasingly populated by nonlawyers, technologists, and 
entrepreneurs.  Lawyers have a so-called monopoly on advocacy work 
on the fall 2010 1L enrollment of 52,488, the largest on record, the spring 2013 graduating class will 
likewise be a high water mark.  Id. 
 4.  See infra Part II.B. 
 5.  See infra Part II.C. 
 6.  Id. at 278; see William D. Henderson, Three Generations of U.S. Lawyers: Generalists, 
Specialists, Project Managers, 70 MD. L. REV. 373, 387 & n.55 (2011) [hereinafter Henderson, 
Three Generations] (“Clients are also refusing to pay for first-or second-year associates” (citation 
omitted)). 
 7.  See infra Part II.B–C. 
 8.  For background on the law school financing issue, including the economics and politics that 
caused the federal government to essentially take over the industry, see William D. Henderson & 
Rachel Zahorsky, The Law School Bubble: How Long Will It Last if Law Grads Can’t Pay Bills?, 
A.B.A. J., Jan. 2012, at 30, 32, available at 
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/the_law_school_bubble_how_long_will_it_last_if_law
_grads_cant_pay_bills/ [hereinafter Henderson & Zahorsky, Law School Bubble]. 
 9.  Id.  
 10.  Id. at 35 (“The U.S. legal profession is in the midst of a broad structural transformation.  
Meeting the challenge to compete in a global economy requires a higher-education policy that 
honestly addresses issues of access, cost containment and national interest.”). 
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before a tribunal and client counseling on legal matters, but that is of little 
consolation.  Virtually every other aspect of a legal problem can be broken 
down into its component parts, reengineered, streamlined, and turned into a 
legal input or legal product that is better, cheaper, and delivered much faster.  
For the next several decades, this will be the growth sector for legal jobs, 
although it is not preordained that these jobs will be filled by law graduates 
or even U.S. citizens.  Further, this is the sector that holds the most promise 
of reducing the massive access to justice gap for the poor and middle class. 
We legal educators need to decide whether we want to be a significant part 
of this new and dynamic legal industry.  If so, some of us need to retool. 
This is a profoundly difficult period of transition for most U.S. law 
schools. Many law professors are bound to have a visceral, negative 
response toward curricular changes that will eat up our discretionary time 
and push us away from an established reward structure and toward new and 
unfamiliar subjects and teaching methods.  We would prefer not to go on 
this journey.  The enormous risk here is that we use our well-oiled intellects 
to resist unpleasant facts, such as the trend lines discussed in the body of this 
essay.11  For many of us, the threat of our law school closing will feel 
remote, abstract, or beyond our own personal time horizons.  Further, the 
greatest prerogative of tenure is autonomy.  In our own minds, resistance to 
decisive leadership can be justified as something noble and principled.  Yet, 
when making institutional decisions, as opposed to a closing courtroom 
argument, great lawyers and leaders do not try to bend or shape facts.  
Instead, they diligently collect all relevant facts and process them with 
ruthless objectivity.12  Now is our time to do the same. 
Fortunately, as I write this essay in the fall of 2012, a growing 
proportion of law professors want to have a focused dialogue on possible 
solutions.  That is what I intend to offer here.  I am offering one blueprint for 
change.  There are others.  But, beware.  If other alternatives seem more 
attractive or less costly, they may be built upon flawed, unrealistic 
assumptions.  Let me be crystal clear on one point: we are making business 
decisions designed to get our institutions to places of safety; we are not 
making pronouncements of our social, political, or aesthetic values.  As a 
group, we have virtually no experience on the former, and entire academic 
careers have enabled us to focus on the latter.  We have to be honest about 
our inexperience in making hard business decisions.  Otherwise, we will not 
 11.  See infra Part II.B. 
 12.  See JAMES C. FREUND, LAWYERING: A REALISTIC APPROACH TO LEGAL PRACTICE 127 
(1979) (“[A] lawyer’s objectivity is his ‘most priceless asset’; when objectivity is sacrificed in an 
effort to please, the advice is useless.”). 
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obtain the desired results, such as a large volume of gainful professional 
employment for our graduates.  For our institutions to survive, the math has 
to work. 
We law professors make business decisions because we control hiring 
and curriculum, which are the core elements of any law school strategy.  
Many of the remaining business decisions are made by law deans, who 
cannot govern without law faculty support.  For the last 100 years, we could 
make these business decisions without imperiling our financial viability.13  
The wind was at our backs due to the broader growth and prosperity of the 
U.S. legal profession and the rise of regulatory bodies that controlled the 
minimum requirements of market entry.14  These fortuitous economic 
conditions enabled us to focus primarily on scholarship rather than 
innovation in curriculum or teaching.15  Those days are rapidly coming to a 
close.16  We now need to exercise true lawyerly judgment to make the right 
tradeoffs. 
The body of this essay has two parts: a description of the problem (Part 
II), then a proposed solution (Part III).  Part II presents evidence of a 
structural shift occurring in the U.S. legal profession—a structural shift that 
is actually gaining momentum rather than subsiding or leveling off.17  It 
discusses the principles that a twenty-first century U.S. law school needs to 
follow in order to survive this shift.  In brief, our students must obtain 
knowledge and skills that are more valuable than their cost of attendance.  
This is a market test passed or failed at the individual law school level.  It 
requires employers—legal and, increasingly, nonlegal—to value the 
knowledge, skills, and abilities we develop over the course of three years.18  
Prospective students will then follow, aided by a new wave of rankings 
borne from the law school transparency movement.19  There is also a 
political test: the federal government has to be satisfied with the rate of 
repayment of law student loans.20 
Part III is about building a curriculum that can reliably and measurably 
transform motivated young people into the type of workers and problem-
 13.  For a magisterial history of legal education through the full maturation of the traditional 
legal education, see ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE  
1850S TO THE 1980S (1983). 
 14.  See generally William D. Henderson, Three Generations, supra note 6. 
 15.  Id. 
 16.  Id. at 387–89. 
 17.  See infra Part II.B–C. 
 18.  Note that I said “three years.”  Changing the length of law school can certainly be put on the 
table.  But that requires a regulatory change and a protracted political battle.  Discussion of this 
“option” can quickly become an academic exercise; I have seen it happen dozens of times.  If I am 
trying to help my own institution survive, I would be focusing my attention on internal matters that 
we control. 
 19.  See infra Part II.B. 
 20.  See infra text accompanying notes 82–92. 
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solvers that are in perennial short supply.21  Legal education has become too 
expensive in time and money for anyone to accept the proposition that law 
school quality is primarily a function of the test scores of the students we 
admit.22  To justify our current price tag, a law degree needs to be a 
transformative educational experience that confers personal and professional 
benefits to students and positive external benefits to society in the form of 
more capable leaders and problem solvers.  To achieve this high bar, we 
need to identify and articulate the knowledge, the skills, and the 
competencies that we want to impart, and develop new systems to measure 
and benchmark our progress. 
I refer to this approach as a competency-based curriculum.  It contains 
five touchstone elements: (1) it identifies examples of professional 
excellence in both the new and old legal economies, (2) breaks them into 
discrete domains of knowledge, skills, and behaviors, identifying both 
overlaps and distinctive feature of specific practice areas, (3) uses an 
iterative process of theory and data to determine the best way to sequence 
and teach these competencies, (4) measures the performance of the program 
as a whole against a baseline (i.e., how well do graduates of this type of 
program do vis-à-vis graduates of a traditional unstructured J.D. program), 
and (5) continuously improves the educational process through feedback 
loops.  Further, for reasons specified in Part III, I believe this agenda can 
only be carried out effectively by a consortium of law schools. 
Although this new orientation is a change management problem,23 not 
everything needs to change.  I maintain that a portion of us needs to retool 
(12% to 20%), another portion needs to serve our institutions by doubling 
 21.  This is true in the new economy. See Matthew Bishop, The Great Mismatch, THE 
ECONOMIST, Sept. 10, 2011, available at http://www.economist.com/node/21528433 (reporting 
evidence from the U.S. and abroad that, despite chronically high unemployment rates, skilled and 
talented workers remain in short supply), as well as the traditional legal market, see Tom Hentoff, 
The Secrets of Superstar Associates, 32 LITIG. J., no. 3, Spring 2006 at 24, 24 (noting that according 
to partners, high quality associates are in “agonizingly short supply”).  
 22.  Stephen P. Klein, Ph.D. & Laura Hamilton, Ph.D., The Validity of the U.S. News and World 
Report Ranking of ABA Law Schools, ASSOC. OF AM. LAW SCHS. (Feb. 18, 1998), 
http://www.aals.org/reports/validity.html (“[T]he student selectivity factor explained about 90% of 
the differences in overall ranks among schools (i.e., percent of total variance).  Since LSAT is the 
major driver of student selectivity (and is highly correlated with UGPA), ranking schools on LSAT 
alone will do a very good job of replicating the overall ranks US News publishes.”).  
 23.  Any law school attempting to turn this corner needs to learn and implement the basic 
principles of change management.  See John P. Kotter, Leading Change: Why Transformation 
Efforts Fail, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan. 2007, at 96 (articulating and explaining Kotter’s renowned eight 
principles of organizational change); see also Fred Nickols, Change Management 101: A Primer, 
DISTANCE CONSULTING LLC, http://www.nickols.us/change.htm (last updated Aug. 23, 2012) (an 
accessible overview by a leading consultant on change management). 
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down on what they do well (50% to 60%), and a third group needs to agree 
not to obstructor alternatively, to move on. 
II.  STRUCTURAL CHANGE AND LAW SCHOOLS 
Over the last few years, I have given dozens of talks at law schools, law 
firms, bar associations, and various industry groups on the topic of structural 
change affecting practicing lawyers and legal education.  These 
presentations walk the audience through several decades of data.  People tell 
me that the topic is scary and depressing.  I believe them.  I have seen the 
reactions on people’s faces and felt the emotion and tension that builds in the 
room.  Nonetheless, we need to deal with these trends to make good 
decisions that affect our organizations and institutions.  Some readers may 
need no further convincing.  They can skip to Part III, which offers at least 
one plan for change.24  Alternatively, if you need facts and figures to 
convince yourself, or to bring along your colleagues, some of the requisite 
data are discussed below. 
Section A articulates the principles of law school viability.25  I begin 
with these core financial principles because they need to be in the forefront 
of our minds when we begin Section B, which presents data on the 
imbalance between the availability of traditional law service jobs (too few) 
and the number of law school graduates (too many).26  Section C presents 
data on a rapidly growing sector of the legal industry that focuses not on 
legal services, but rather legal inputs and legal products.27  Law schools and 
most practicing lawyers know little or nothing about this nascent sector—a 
sector that is contributing to the decline in jobs and earning power of our 
graduates; this is a knowledge gap that needs to be filled as quickly and 
completely as possible. 
A.  First Principles of Law School Viability 
The financial viability of law schools depends upon three interrelated 
factors: 
 
(1) A law school needs prospective students willing to enroll 
(“students”). 
 
(2) A reliable way to finance the students’ desire to enroll (“ability to 
pay”). 
 24.  See infra Part III.C. 
 25.  See infra Part II.A. 
 26.  See infra Part II.B. 
 27.  See infra Part II.C. 
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(3) Upon graduation, students enjoy enhanced employment prospects 
and earning power (“professional employment”). 
 
Among these three factors, the third is the most important: high quality 
professional employment.  Like water running downhill, the jobs attract 
prospective students; and the reliable earning power of those jobs attracts a 
method of finance.  Without jobs for its graduates, any law school enterprise 
will eventually fail.  The students and financiers will wise up and abandon 
the school and its faculty. 
A focus on business factors is new for us.  For the past two decades, the 
market for legal education has been seemingly defined by a rankings 
competition.28  We focused on rankings, or lamented their inaccuracies and 
limitations, because virtually no law school was feeling pressure on the three 
factors that make a law school financially viable.  Now that the entry level 
legal market has hit hard times,29 applicants are in much shorter supply.30 
Yet, rankings are not irrelevant to our analysis.  Rather, they raise short-
term strategy questions with no easy answers.  Lower rankings affect 
applicant volume.31  Thus, if a law school attempts to enroll the same size 
entering class as prior years, and its peers cut their enrollment, it may drop 
 28.  See, e.g., Rachel F. Moran, Of Rankings and Regulation: Are the U.S. News & World 
Report Rankings Really a Subversive Force in Legal Education?, 81 IND. L.J. 383, 383 (2006) 
(discussing symposium on rankings in which rankings were referred to as “the 800-pound gorilla of 
legal education”). 
 29.  See Karen Sloan, A Dismal Job Market for Law Grads Got Even Worse for Class of 2011, 
NAT’L L.J. (June 7, 2012), http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202558291685&slret 
urn=20120820004951# (reporting that “not quite 66 percent of the recent graduates were in jobs that 
require bar membership—down by 9 percent since 2008” and that “12 percent of the class of 2011 
had part-time jobs nine months after graduating, when 5 percent was the norm during flusher 
times”). 
 30.  See Debra Cassens Weiss, Law School Applications for Fall 2012 Drop More than 15 
Percent, A.B.A. J. (Jan. 20, 2012, 10:19 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/ 
law_school_applications_for_fall_2012_drop_more_than_15_percent/.  According to data published 
on the LSAC website, registrations for the Credentials Assembly Service (CAS), formerly known as 
LSDAS, has declined from 94,200 for the 2002–2003 admission season to 62,000 in 2011–2012.  
See LSAC Volume Summary, LSAC.ORG, http://www.lsac.org/LSACResources/Data/PDFs/LSAC-
volume-summary.pdf (last visited Nov. 10, 2012) (published data in LSAC Resources Data).  During 
this same period, first year enrollment with the ABA has been nearly identical (48,400 in the fall of 
2002 and 48,700 in fall of 2011).  See LSAC Volume Summary, supra. 
 31.  See Michael Sauder & Ryon Lancaster, Do Rankings Matter? The Effects of U.S. News & 
World Report Rankings on the Admissions Process of Law Schools, 40 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 105, 
122–25 (2006) (using regression analysis to show that changes in rankings are closely associated 
with the volume of applications to law schools, especially among high-LSAT candidates, thus 
affecting school selectivity—another rankings input—and ultimately influencing the size and 
direction of any subsequent changes in the U.S. News rankings). 
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in the rankings.32  This may set in motion a downward spiral that creates 
stiffer headwinds in the future.  Yet, the alternatives are fraught with peril.  
A school could hang on to its LSAT-UGPA input numbers by cutting 
enrollment33 or handing out lavish scholarships,34 but this is expensive and 
unsustainable.  If applicant volume stays low or further declines, there will 
have to be a day of financial reckoning in which layoffs and closure are put 
squarely on the table. 
In the current environment, there is enormous risk that law schools will 
focus on the short term issues of enrollment, rankings management, and 
tightened budgets.35  Yet, if we take that tact, we will not invest in a longer 
term strategy for cultivating more employment opportunities for graduates.  
As a result, the law school never gets to safer ground. 
There are at least three reasons why a law school should muster the 
energy and fortitude to simultaneously formulate and execute a long term 
strategy focused on high quality professional employment: 
 
(1) Market share.  In an era of dwindling or flat law school applicants, 
the schools with pipelines to jobs will take market share in terms of 
applicants.36  And schools will need that market share to stay open.  
My school or your school doesn’t have to outrun the bear, just the 
other law schools.  I am not stating my preferences here.  My 
preferences, and the readers’, are irrelevant.  I am stating the 
competitive dynamics that apply to a flat or contracting industry. 
 
(2) No place to hide.  We are living in era of heighted transparency.  As 
of 2012, granular law school-level outcome data will be posted 
annually on the ABA website.37  These data, supplemented with 
 32.  See id. at 125–129. 
 33.  See Joe Palazzolo & Chelsea Phipps, With Profession Under Stress, Law Schools Cut 
Admissions, WALL ST. J. (June 11, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405270230 
3444204577458411514818378.html (reporting that at least ten schools have publicly announced 
smaller entering classes). 
 34.  See Karen Sloan, It’s a Buyers’ Market at Law School, NAT’L L.J. (June 25, 2012), 
http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202560485444&Its_a_buyers_market_at_law_s
chool_&slreturn=20120901180223 (reporting that some law schools are “sweetening their 
scholarship packages” to lock in desirable prospective students). 
 35.  See Recent Law School News Focuses on Rankings, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT (July 5, 
2012), http://www.usnews.com/education/blogs/college-rankings-blog/2012/07/05/recent-law-school 
-news-focuses-on-rankings (“According to Kaplan’s report based on a June 2012 survey of Kaplan 
Test Prep’s LSAT students: ‘When asked, “What is most important to you when picking a law 
school to apply to?”[] 32% cited a law school’s ranking . . . .’”).  
 36.  See id. (indicating that “U.S. News urges law school applicants not to heavily rely on the 
rankings as the basis for where to apply . . . [and] to strongly consider cost, location, course 
offerings, and job prospects.”). 
 37.  See Class of 2011 Legal Employment and Underemployment Numbers Are in, and Far 
Worse than Expected, LAW SCHOOL TRANSPARENCY (June 15, 2012), 
http://www.lawschooltransparency.com/2012/06/class-of-2011-legal-employment-and-
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other information, will be used by entrepreneurs to create 
benchmarks that will essentially test whether a school under- or 
over-performs on its U.S. News ranking in terms of employment and 
other measures.38  With information costs near zero, prospective 
students will bargain hard over scholarship aid; thereafter, they will 
vote with their feet.  This is the mechanism by which schools will 
gain and lose market share. 
 
(3) Federal loans contingent on employment outcomes.  Since the 
passage of federal legislation in 2010, the Department of Education 
has become the banker to law schools and all of higher education.39  
Law students are financed under the same generous terms given to 
doctors and dentists,40 yet their economic fates are diverging from 
their doctor and dentist counterparts.41  For the last few years, 
student indebtedness has gone up42 and entry level lawyer salaries 
have gone down.43  If law students have significantly lower 
underemployment-numbers-are-in-and-far-worse-than-expected/ (detailing the employment 
outcomes published by the ABA for the class of 2011). 
 38.  I know these entrepreneurs.  There is money to be made here while at the same time 
believing that you are helping prospective students.  Law schools have long wanted to get rid of the 
U.S. News & World Report rankings.  New entrants will not necessarily make life easier for law 
schools.   
 39.  See Peter Baker & David M. Herszenhorn, Obama Signs Overhaul of Student Loan 
Program, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2010, at A14, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/ 
03/31/us/politics/31obama.html?_r=0 (reporting on federal legislation that eliminates role for private 
banks in federally subsidized student loans); see also Henderson & Zahorsky, Law School Bubble, 
supra note 8 (discussing history leading up to change in federal law and discussing current and 
future implications). 
 40.  At present, any student admitted into an ABA-accredited law school who has not defaulted 
on federal student loans is eligible for Direct Plus loans originated from the U.S. Department of 
Education up to “the cost of attendance (determined by the school) minus any other financial 
assistance received,” as set forth by the U.S. Department of Education for professional school 
education.  See information on “How much can I borrow?” located on Plus Loans, FEDERAL 
STUDENT AID, http://studentaid.ed.gov/types/loans/plus#how-much-can-i (last visited Nov. 10, 
2012). 
 41.  See Matt Leichter, At Last, a Rational Explanation for Why Law School Tuition Keeps 
Rising, AM. L. DAILY (Mar. 1, 2012, 7:01 PM), http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/amlawdaily/2012/03/ 
at-last-a-rational-explanation-for-why-law-school-tuition-keeps-rising.html (comparing Department 
of Labor employment statistics and projections for lawyers, dentists, and doctors and noting that 
market is projected to be substantially weaker for lawyers). 
 42.  See BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, FAILING LAW SCHOOLS 109–10 (2012) (reporting that average 
law school debt has climbed from approximately $16,000 in the mid-1980s to $47,000 in 1999 and 
to $98,500 for the class of 2010). 
 43.  See Karen Sloan, Starting Salaries Continue Slide as Big Firm Opportunities Dry Up, 
NAT’L L.J. (July 12, 2012), http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202562736465& 
Starting_salaries_contine_slide_as_big_frim_opportunties_dry_up_ (reporting on NALP data 
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repayment rates than their professional counterparts (due to a much 
higher reliance on income-based repayment programs),44 the 
Department of Education, or even Congress, is bound to ask 
whether it should continue writing such large checks to law schools.  
The logical policy adjustment—already in place for for-profit 
colleges45—is to make eligibility for federal loans contingent upon a 
minimum threshold of graduate employment and repayment. 
 
If a law school is performing well on professional employment for its 
graduates, the threats of insufficient quality students and inadequate 
financing mechanisms will largely fall away, or be less severe than for 
competitors.  This is why a law school, acute as the short term problems 
might be, needs to build an infrastructure to deliver long-term employment 
outcomes.  But before we can better prepare students for a changing legal 
marketplace, we need to understand for ourselves how legal work is 
changing.46  If we are indulging false assumptions about the marketplace, we 
are likely to execute a plan that is headed in the exact wrong direction. 
B.  The Decline of Traditional Legal Service Jobs 
As a general matter, the economic engine of law schools has been 
lawyers working in private practice.  As shown in Figure 1 below, during the 
first half of the twentieth century, the overwhelming majority of law school 
graduates worked in this sector.  Further, the vast majority worked as solo 
practitioners or as individual lawyers in office-sharing arrangements.  
According to a national census of lawyers drawn from the Martindale-
Hubbell directory (estimated to be 90% complete), there were 171,110 
lawyers working in the United States in 1948.47  Among the roughly 152,600 
working in private practice, 66.2% were identified as solo practitioners.48  
Within law firms, roughly 40,500 were classified as partners, with the 
remaining 7,500 positions composed of associates—a mere 4.7% of the 
private practice bar.49  According to statistics compiled in 1947 by the U.S. 
showing that the “median starting salary has dropped by 17 percent since 2009 . . . and the average 
salary has decreased by 16 percent,” largely due to the collapse of large law firm hiring). 
 44.  See generally Income-Based Plan, FEDERAL STUDENT AID, http://studentaid.ed.gov/repay-
loans/understand/plans/income-based (last visited Oct. 1, 2012). 
 45.  See Kimberly Railey, Why Some For-Profit Colleges Could Lose Eligibility for Federal Aid, 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Jun. 27, 2012), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Education/2012/0627/ 
Why-some-for-profit-colleges-could-lose-eligibility-for-federal-aid (discussing implementation of 
new “gainful employment” rules for vocational centers run by for-profit colleges). 
 46.  See infra Part II.C. 
 47.  See Albert P. Blaustein, The 1949 Lawyer Count: A Preliminary Statement, 36 A.B.A. J. 
370, 371–72 (1950). 
 48.  Id. at 372. 
 49.  Id. 
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Department of Commerce, the average law firm had an average of 1.64 
members.50 
 
Figure 1.  Breakdown of Lawyers by Practice Setting, 1930 to 1970 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Data Source: See RICHARD ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS 299 tbl.37b (1989) 
With such a large proportion of the bar working as solo practitioners,51 
there was little expectation that law schools were responsible for finding 
paid employment for their graduates.52  A 1950 survey of lawyers in private 
practice inquired about the most important sources of help in finding 
employment or making a start in practice.53  Nearly 80% reported personal 
contacts followed by 47% from personal efforts.54  Only 10% of lawyers 
reported law school placement offices as an important source of 
opportunities, albeit only twelve of 102 surveyed law schools had 
established a separate office for this function55—an enormously different 
world than legal education in the year 2012. 
In the intervening sixty years, the expectations of law school graduates 
have changed substantially.  As the economy has become more complex, 
 50.  See William Weinfeld, Income of Lawyers, 1929–48, 29 SUR. OF CURRENT BUS., Aug. 1949, 
at 18, 21. 
 51.  See Blaustein, supra note 47, at 372. 
 52.  See Weinfeld, supra note 50, at 19, 23–24. 
 53.  See Louis A. Toepfer, Placement in the Legal Profession: A Responsibility of the Organized 
Bar, 37 A.B.A. J. 497, 498 (1951). 
 54.  See id. (“Organized placement activity seems to be a fairly recent development.”). 
 55.  See id. at 499. 
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interconnected, and regulated, there has been a massive surge in paid 
employment for lawyers.56  Over the last three decades, lawyers working for 
organizational clients, either as in-house attorneys or outside counsel, have 
prospered the most.57  The primary driver of this prosperity has been a 
relative shortage of sophisticated and highly specialized lawyers—a shortage 
that has been cured by the rise of the large law firm.58 
 
Figure 2.  Total Law Office Employment, 1998 to 2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Data Source: County Business Patterns (1988–2010), U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU59 
At the same time the number of technically sophisticated lawyers has 
proliferated, industry data suggest that the total number of jobs in private 
 56.  See, e.g., Salary Trends—A 13-Year Overview, NALP.ORG (Sept. 2003), 
http://www.nalp.org/2003sepsalarytrends (showing an 80% rise in median starting salaries for 
lawyers between 1990 and 2002). 
 57.  The financial fortunes of the lawyers serving organizational clients are magnificently 
chronicled in the Chicago Lawyers I and II studies.  See generally JOHN P. HEINZ & EDWARD 
LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAR (rev. ed. 1994) (Chicago 
Lawyers I); JOHN P. HEINZ ET AL., URBAN LAWYERS: THE NEW SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAR 99 
(2005) (Chicago Lawyers II) (reporting that between 1975 and 1995 large law firms were the “clear 
winner[s] in the market for legal services”). 
 58.  See Henderson, Three Generations, supra note 6, at 380 (“As the size of the corporate bar 
has expanded over the last several decades, the total volume of technically sophisticated lawyers 
(specialists) is at an all-time high.” (citing William D. Henderson & Leonard Bierman, An Empirical 
Analysis of Lateral Lawyer Trends from 2000 to 2007: The Emerging Equilibrium for Corporate 
Law Firms, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1395, 1396 (2009) (describing an increase in the number 
of partners and associates in large law firms over the past three decades))). 
 59.  Generated by William Henderson, based upon data from U.S. CENSUS BUREAU. 
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law practice has plateaued and may now be on the decline.60  As shown in 
Figure 2, which is drawn from the U.S. Census Bureau County Business 
Patterns dataset, the high-water mark for law office employment was 2004—
nearly nine years ago.61  As of 2010, total employee head count in U.S. law 
offices has contracted by over 47,000 employees.62 
Recent data published by the National Association for Law Placement 
(NALP) reveal long-term trend lines that are profoundly troubling for entry-
level lawyers and thus, by extension, for law schools.63  As shown in Figure 
3, the proportion of new graduate jobs in private practices has been on a 
downward slide since the late 1980s.  This pattern, however, is not 
necessarily attributable to a corresponding shrinkage in the entry-level 
market.  Rather, it is likely due, at least in part, to a surge in supply.64  As 
shown in Figure 4, during the same twenty-five-plus year time frame, the 
number of ABA-approved law schools has increased from 175 to 201 
(14.8%) and the number of graduates has risen from 41,000 to 49,000 
(19.5%).65  With the supply of entry level law school graduates outstripping 
demand, entry-level salaries have declined precipitously.  For the class of 
2010, the adjusted mean salary for a law school graduate was $77,333, a 9% 
decline from the 2009 high-water mark of $84,952.66  For the class of 2011, 
the market tumbled another 4% to an adjusted mean salary of $73,984.67 
  
 60.  See generally County Business Patterns (1998–2010), U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, available at 
http://censtats.census.gov/cgi-bin/cbpnaic/cbpsect.pl. 
 61.  See supra Figure 2. 
 62.  The County Business Pattern dataset includes payroll and head count data for both lawyer 
and nonlawyer employees, but the trend lines are likely the worst for lawyers.  Other data from the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics suggest that lawyer jobs are trailing both paralegals and legal assistants.  
See U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, OCCUPATIONAL OUTLOOK HANDBOOK (2012), available 
at http://www.bls.gov/ooh/legal/home.htm.  
 63.  See Class of 2011 Has Lowest Employment Rate Since Class of 1994, NALP.ORG (July 
2012), http://www.nalp.org/0712research. 
 64.  Enrollment and Degrees Awarded, AMERICANBAR.ORG, http://www.americanbar.org/ 
content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_and_admissions_to_the_bar/statistics/enrollment_d
egrees_awarded.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited Oct. 1, 2012). 
 65.  See id. 
 66.  See Starting Salaries Re-Examined: A Critical Look at Averages, NALP.ORG (Oct. 2010), 
http://www.nalp.org/oct2010adjustedsalmean (explaining the importance of using adjusted mean 
salary data, which statistically corrects for the low response rate among graduates in lower paying 
jobs; reporting adjusted means for every other year from 1999 to 2009); see also Salary Distribution 
Curve, NALP.ORG, www.nalp.org/salarydistrib (last visited Nov. 11, 2012) (showing in chart format 
the adjusted means for the classes of 2010 and 2011). 
 67.  See Salary Distribution Curve, supra note 66.  
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Figure 3. Percentage of Entry Level Jobs in Private Practice 
1985 to 2011 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Data Source: Class of 2011 Has Lowest Employment Rate Since Class of 
1994, NALP.ORG (July 2012)68 
 
Figure 4. Incoming 1L Classes ABA-Accredited Law Schools 
1985 to 2011 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Data Source: ABA Section on Legal Education and Admission to the Bar69 
 68.  See Class of 2011 Has Lowest Employment Rate Since Class of 1994, supra note 63. 
 69.  See Enrollment and Degrees Awarded, supra note 64.  
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Figure 5. Employment Outcomes for the Class of 2011 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Data Source: ABA Section on Legal Education and Admission to the Bar70 
 
Figure 6.  Employment Outcomes by U.S. News & World Report Rankings 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Data Source: ABA Section on Legal Education and Admission to the Bar 
Calculated by William D. Henderson (June 2012). 
 70.  See Employment Summary Report, AM. BAR ASSOC. SEC. OF LEGAL EDUC., 
http://employmentsummary.abaquestionnaire.org/ (select class “2011” under “Compilation All-
Schools Data” section; then click on “Download Complete Employment Data”) (last visited Nov. 11, 
2012). 
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As a result of the numerous lawsuits against law schools, the ABA 
Section of Legal Education and Admission to the Bar has finally adopted 
disclosure standards for law schools that make it virtually impossible to 
conceal bad employment outcomes.71  Each employment outcome is broken 
down by sector (private practice, government, business, public interest, 
unknown), whether bar passage is required, and whether the employment is 
full-time versus part-time, or short-term versus long-term.72  These data are 
now published in spreadsheet format and available for download on the 
ABA’s website.73 
The outcomes for the class of 2011 are bleak.  As shown in Figure 5, 
only 55% of law graduates obtained full-time, long-term (FTLT) bar 
passage-required employment nine months following graduation.  Another 
12% found professional full-time, long-term professional employment in 
jobs that do not require bar passage or even a J.D.74  Not surprisingly, these 
jobs generally pay lower salaries than bar passage-required jobs.75  The vast 
majority of the remaining one-third of graduates are either unemployed or 
underemployed.76  Remarkably, these numbers are probably optimistic.  Four 
hundred seventy-six members of the class of 2011 (over 1%) were hired into 
FTLT jobs that were funded by their graduating law schools.77  Fifty-six 
percent of these jobs were provided by law schools in the top fourteen 
according to U.S. News & World Report rankings—i.e., wealthy, elite 
national law schools.  Eight law schools account for 72% (342) of all the 
FTLT school-funded jobs, and all are top twenty-five law schools.78  All of 
this information, on a school by school basis, is now fully disclosed.79 
Although the elite national law schools are clearly faring better than 
their non-elite counterparts, the breakdown in Figure 6 makes clear that the 
employment issues are largely systemic to all of legal education.80  Outside 
of the elite national law schools, between 30% and 42% of law graduates are 
 71.  See 2012–2013 ABA STANDARDS AND RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW 
SCHOOLS, Standards Nos. 508–510 (2012), available at http://www.americanbar.org/groups/ 
legal_education/resources/standards.html.  
 72.  See Employment Summary Report, supra note 70. 
 73.  See id.  
 74.  See supra Figure 5. 
 75.  See Class of 2011 National Summary Report, NALP.ORG (July 2012), 
www.nalp.org/uploads/NatlSummChart_Classof2011.pdf (reporting average salary of $81,050 for 
Bar Passage Required versus $63,995 for J.D. Advantage and $66,547 for Other Professional).   
 76.  See id. 
 77.  See supra Figure 5. 
 78.  See supra Figure 5. 
 79.  Readers can look at the names of the law schools themselves.  I am not calling them out.  
There is no moral high ground here. 
 80.  See supra Figure 6. 
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failing to obtain permanent employment following graduation.81  In short, 
this is an industry-wide crisis. 
I use the word “crisis” with some trepidation.  Unfortunately, the word 
fits.  As chronicled by Brian Tamanaha in his important book, Failing Law 
Schools, the collapse in both jobs and earning power of law school graduates 
coincides with a relentless increase in student debt.82  Average law school 
debt has more than doubled between 1999 and 2010, rising from $47,000 to 
$98,500.83  When the average undergraduate debt is factored in (over 
$25,000 per student borrower), the total educational burden for the average 
borrower rises to nearly $125,000.84  Further, many law schools have 
average debt loads much higher than the overall average.85  And within most 
law schools, there are students with $150,000 to $300,000 of total 
educational debt.86 
As Professor Tamanaha ably demonstrates, in the current job market, 
many if not most law graduates have very little prospect of even keeping up 
with, much less paying off, their educational debt.87  Eventually, a 
substantial portion of these educational funds will be written off through 
either uncollectable student defaults or loan forgiveness through the Federal 
Government Income-Based Repayment (IBR) or Public Service Programs.88  
These two programs effectively cap repayment obligations according to a 
formula based on a borrower’s income; they also waive any payment at all if 
a borrower falls below a minimum income threshold.89  Yet, when borrowers 
are unable to keep up with their interest payments, total indebtedness grows 
through a process called “negative amortization.”90  Thus, the law school 
 81.  See supra Figure 6. 
 82.  See TAMANAHA, supra note 42, at 101–25. 
 83.  See id. at 109–10. 
 84.  See id. at 109–11.   
 85.  See id. at 110–11 (reporting twenty-two law schools with the highest law school debt loads, 
ranging from $123,025 to $145,621). 
 86.  See Jim Chen, A Degree of Practical Wisdom: The Ratio of Educational Debt to Income as a 
Basic Measurement of Law School Graduates’ Economic Viability, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 
1185, 1200 (2012) (noting that, “Law student debt varies widely. . . .  [P]rivate law school[] . . . 
graduates routinely incur $100,000 or more in law school debt alone.”). 
 87.  See TAMANAHA, supra note 42, at 107–25. 
 88.  See id. at 124. 
 89.  The formula is “15 percent of the difference between your AGI [adjusted gross income] and 
150 percent of the Department of Health and Human Services Poverty Guideline for your family size 
and state.”  See Income-Based Repayment Plan for the Direct Loan and FFEL Programs, FEDERAL 
STUDENT AID, available at http://studentaid.ed.gov/sites/default/files/income-based-repayment.pdf 
(last visited Nov. 11, 2012).  
 90.  See Letter from Professor Deborah Jones Merritt, Moritz College of Law, The Ohio State 
University, to Dean John F. O’Brien, Chair, Council and Accreditation Committee, ABA Section of 
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graduates who have failed to receive a boost in income have the potential—
and for many, the likelihood—of being dogged by their law school debt for 
decades.  This creates a highly volatile political and economic issue that will 
likely grow over time. 
When the federal government is experiencing lower levels of repayment 
for law school graduates,91 and the graduates themselves are complaining 
about the terms of the loans, what is the likelihood that the federal 
government will continue to issue a blank check to U.S. law schools?  The 
federal government’s lending for legal education is premised on the belief 
that a law degree enhances a recipient’s human capital, and surely that is 
true.  But at what cost?  At today’s tuition rates and levels of student 
indebtedness, it is possible that for many students the value of a law degree 
is not worth the cost.92  Let me summarize so that I am not misinterpreted: 
Our current legal education is likely to enhance the human capital of our 
students, but in the emerging economic environment, the benefits of that 
education are insufficient to pay back its cost.  We may believe that our own 
institutions offer a very good legal education.  But, that is not the issue here.  
The issue is whether the education we offer is able to adapt to the rapidly 
changing legal industry. 
The value of the law degree is cast into doubt by two factors.  First, the 
traditional engine of law school economics—lawyers working in private 
practice—has plateaued.93  Second, the number of law schools has 
proliferated and continues to churn out near record numbers of law 
graduates.  Even with the benefit of generous federal financing—an 
assumption that may not hold—law schools will continue to experience 
uncomfortable levels of competition trying to fill their seats, and, in turn, 
will have difficulty finding their graduates meaningful professional 
employment.  This pressure will produce higher levels of both failure and 
innovation. 
Legal Education and Admission to the Bar 2 (Nov. 14, 2011), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/2011_build/legal_education/committees/stan
dards_review_documents/20111116_comment_general_s510_deborah_merritt.authcheckdam.pdf 
(discussing the “negative amortization” as one of the consequences of the current system of higher 
tuition and student debt combined with stagnant incomes).  
 91.  Id. at 124. 
 92.  Several recent articles explore this question.  See, e.g., Chen, supra note 86, at 1201–04 
(calculating out the income needed by a law student to capably handle various levels of educational 
debt and concluding that comfortable levels of debt and current tuition rates require incomes of 
$96,000 to $288,000 per year); see also Herwig Schlunk, Mamas 2011: Is a Law Degree a Good 
Investment Today? 19–20 (Vand. L. & Econ., Working Paper No. 11-42, 2011), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1957139 (calculating, after factoring in opportunity costs based on 
undergraduate prospects, that law school in the current economic climate is a bad economic 
investment for over two-thirds of law graduates). 
 93.  See Nathan Koppel, Bar Raised for Law-Grad Jobs, WALL ST. J. (May 5, 2010), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704866204575224350917718446.html. 
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C.  Susskind’s World: The Rise of Legal Inputs and Legal Products 
Things are getting tougher for law schools because we train our 
graduates for the legal services market.  Yet, the legal services market is 
gradually being upended by new entrants who are offering legal inputs and 
legal products to law firms, legal departments, and average citizens.94  The 
principal attraction behind a legal input or a legal product is very simple: 
technology or a better-designed process is reducing the need for expensive, 
artisan-trained lawyers.95  In many cases, by removing the lawyer from the 
value chain, cost goes down, quality goes up, and service delivery time 
becomes faster.96 
This is a paradigm shift.  The best commentator on this shift is Richard 
Susskind, the British lawyer, technology expert, and futurist.97  In his 2008 
book, The End of Lawyers?,98 Susskind introduced a framework, shown in 
Figure 7, that describes the evolution of the legal industry.99  Along a 
continuum that moves left to right, Susskind asserts that legal work is 
gradually migrating from bespoke (e.g., court room practice), to 
standardized (e.g., form documents for a merger), to systematized (e.g., a 
document-assembly system for estate planning), to packaged (e.g., a turn-
key regulatory compliance program), to commoditized (e.g., any IT-based 
legal product that is undifferentiated in a market with many competitors).100  
These changes are made possible by identifying recursive patterns in legal 
 94.  See RICHARD SUSSKIND, THE END OF LAWYERS? 9–10 (2010) [hereinafter SUSSKIND, THE 
END OF LAWYERS?]. 
 95.  Id. at 11. 
 96.  Id. 
 97.  Susskind has a strong track record predicting the future of the legal profession.  In 1996, 
Susskind predicted that lawyers and their clients would soon communicate by e-mail.  Senior 
officials at the Law Society urged that Susskind not be allowed to speak in public because “the 
feeling was that I had failed to understand confidentiality and was bringing the profession into 
disrepute.”  See Richard Susskind, Does the Law Society Know that There’s an Internet Generation, 
TIMESONLINE (London) (May 13, 2010), http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/law/article2509518.ece.  
 98.  See SUSSKIND, THE END OF LAWYERS?, supra note 94.  
 99.  Id. at 29. At the time of publication, I learned that Richard Susskind's new book, 
TOMORROW'S LAWYERS (Oxford 2013) would be released within the month.  Richard was kind 
enough to share a pre-publication manuscript.  It is lucid account of a revolution that is well 
underway.  The first two paragraphs read: 
 This is book is a short introduction to the future for young and aspiring lawyers. 
 Tomorrow's legal world, as predicted and described here, bears little resemblance to 
that of the past. Legal institutions and lawyers are at a crossroads, I claim, and are poised 
to change more radically over the next two decades than they have over the last two 
centuries. If you are a young lawyer, this revolution will happen on your watch. 
RICHARD SUSSKIND, TOMORROW'S LAWYERS: AN INTRODUCTION TO YOUR FUTURE (forthcoming 
2013). 
 100.  See id. at 28–33. 
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forms and judicial opinions, which enables the use of process and 
technology to routinize and scale very cheap and very high quality solutions 
to the myriad of legal needs.101 
 
Figure 7.  Richard Susskind’s Evolution of Legal Industry102 
 
 
Lawyers, of course, are quite frightened by the paradigm shift.  So, 
according to Susskind, their natural reaction is double-down on the 
“bespoke” work and claim that this artisan craft is a specialty.103  One 
problem with this reaction is that it is shared universally by nearly all 
lawyers.104  Clients do not want to pay a lot of money for their legal solution; 
thus, they are leading the relentless “pull to the right.”105  More significantly, 
there is more money outside of the shrinking quantity of bespoke legal 
work.106  As Susskind points out, the greatest profit-making opportunities are 
lodged between the systemized and packaged parts of the continuum.107  If 
an organization can continuously innovate and create systematized or 
packaged solutions to legal issues and problems that can be sold over and 
over again to a large base of clients, the organization can enjoy the prospect 
of “making money while you sleep.”108 
When I first heard Richard Susskind speak in 2009 (shortly after the 
publication of his book) and then subsequently read his book, I found his 
model intellectually coherent and, at a theoretical level, highly cogent.  But 
on a practical level, the ideas seemed abstract.  Who were these new legal 
entrepreneurs?  And what were the products and services they are offering?  
I am an academic, so I was content that I found an interesting intellectual 
puzzle.  And that was it. 
Susskind’s model became less abstract during the summer of 2010 when 
I examined data from the U.S. Census Bureau County Business Patterns 
 101.  Id. at 6. 
 102.  Id. at 29. 
 103.  Id. at 34. 
 104.  Id. 
 105.  Id. at 35 (“If the clients’ pull away from bespoke service were not sufficient to incline law 
firms rightwards, then the prospect of competitors driving in that direction should surely give pause 
for thought.”). 
 106.  Id. at 37–38. 
 107.  Id. 
 108.  Id. at 37.  
07 HENDERSON SSRN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/13/13  10:17 AM 
[Vol. 40: 461, 2013] A Blueprint for Change 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
481 
dataset.109  One of the Census Bureau’s duties is to create and maintain a 
taxonomy of the nation’s economic activity and use it to track employer 
type, payroll data, and geographic location.110  The nature and composition 
of economic activity continuously evolves, so every few decades the entire 
classification system needs to be replaced.  This last happened in 1997, 
when the North American Industrial Classification System (NAICS) 
supplanted the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) system.111  The 
economic trends I observed in the summer of 2010 (limited to data through 
2008, as the data has a two year lag) got my attention.  Since then, the 
troubling pattern has only become more pronounced. 
Consider the following.  The NAICS code for legal services is 5411.112  
In 2010, this sector employed 1,172,748 employees (as of March 15, 
2010).113  Of these workers, 91.7% are employed in law offices (NAICS 
54111), which is down from 94.2% in 1998.114  The second biggest category 
in the 5411 category is Title Abstract and Settlement Offices (NAICS 
541191), which is driven by the requirement in some states that lawyers 
participate in real estate closing.  This subsector employed 69,399 in 2010—
down from the 85,759 high-water market in 2006, which is a clear fallout 
from the real estate bubble that nearly took down the entire U.S. economy.  
The only other 5411 subsector is the catch-all “All Other Legal Services” 
(NAICS 541199).115  This subsector has steadily grown from 9,800 workers 
in 1998 to 23,504 workers in 2010. 
 
 109.  See generally County Business Patterns, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, available at 
http://www.census.gov/econ/cbp/ (last visited Nov. 11, 2012). 
 110.  Id. 
 111.  See North American Industry Classification System (NAICS), U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
available at http://www.census.gov/eos/www/naics/ (last visited Nov. 11, 2012).  
 112.  A reference table to NAICS codes is available at http://www.census.gov/eos/www/naics/ 
(follow “2012 NAICS Structure” hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 11, 2012). 
 113.  See County Business Patterns, supra note 109 (follow the hyperlink to specific year). 
 114.  Id. 
 115.  See NAICS codes, supra note 112. 
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Figure 8.  Change in Number of Employees in Legal Service Industry Since 
1998, Law Offices vs. All Other Legal Services 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8 above plots the percentage growth in “Offices of Lawyers” 
versus “All Other Legal Services.”116  The Offices of Lawyers trendline is 
the same one shown in Figure 2.117  This reveals 2004 as the high-water 
mark for law office employment.118  Again, the total employment decline has 
been roughly 48,000 workers.119  Yet, since 2004, the All Other Legal 
Services group has grown by nearly 8,000.120  The average job in a law 
office pays $80,000 versus $46,000 in All Other Legal Services.121  But the 
most striking feature is the rate of growth, which averages 8.5% a year.  In 
1998, All Other Legal Services comprised 0.9% of 5411.  As of 2010, the 
percentage had increased to 2.2%—and at the time of this writing, these data 
are 2.5 years old. 
What companies comprise the 541199 subsector?  Because County 
Business Patterns data include payroll and headcount information, which is 
information that a company would like to withhold from rivals, it is 
 116.  See supra Figure 8. 
 117.  See supra Figure 2. 
 118.  See supra Figure 8. 
 119.  See supra Figure 8. 
 120.  See supra Figure 8. 
 121.  Calculations made by author from U.S. County Business Patterns data.  I divided total 
payroll by the number of employees in each subsector.  
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anonymous and aggregated at the county level.122  As a result, we don’t 
know the identities of these companies.  But we do know that the following 
states have at least one All Other Legal Services employer, employing 
between 500 and 999 workers: Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Missouri, New 
York, Ohio, and Pennsylvania.123  Likewise, in the 100 to 499 employee 
range, California has eight employers; Florida, Illinois, and Texas have two; 
and Connecticut, Indiana, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Jersey, Ohio, and 
Pennsylvania each have one.124  The states with the biggest All Other Legal 
Service payrolls are California ($201 million, 4,222 employees, 553 
establishments), followed by Florida ($125 Million, 2,925 employers, 697 
establishments) and New York ($113 million, 2,501 employees, 297 
establishments).125 
As someone who purportedly studies the legal industry, I know 
embarrassingly little about this burgeoning subsector.  That said, these 
companies could be the very vendors that Susskind described in The End of 
Lawyers?  The following questions jump immediately to mind: 
• Who are these employers? 
• What services and products are they providing? 
• Why are they growing so quickly? 
• What is the connection between the flat office employment 
figures and growth in this sector? 
Based on my readings and monitoring of the legal industry, my best 
assessment is that some substantial portion of these companies are contract 
registry services that assemble contract attorneys for large electronic 
discovery and due diligence projects.  One of the biggest is Robert Half, 
which has twenty-six locations throughout the United States and Canada.126  
 122.  This information is withheld at the county level when it would functionally reveal 
competitive information on specific employers.  
 123.  See County Business Patterns, supra note 109 (follow link for each specific state) (last 
visited Sept. 30, 2012). 
 124.  Id.   
 125.  Id.   
 126.  Robert Half’s description of their services: “We place lawyers, paralegals, law clerks and 
legal support professionals on a temporary, project and full-time basis in high-demand practice 
areas.  We also provide project teams, along with dedicated space and high-tech resources, for a 
wide range of initiatives including litigation support, M&A review and discovery matters.”  About 
Us, ROBERT HALF LEGAL, http://www.roberthalflegal.com/AboutUs (last visited Nov. 11, 2012).  
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Robert Half is owned by Robert Half International, which is a public 
company traded on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE symbol: RHI).127  
The SEC filings do not break out information on their legal services 
business.  Similarly, a competitor of Robert Half is Special Counsel, which 
“places attorneys, paralegals . . . and legal support personnel on a temporary, 
temporary-to-direct hire, and direct hire basis into law firms and corporate 
legal departments.”128  Special Counsel is owned by Adecco Group North 
America,129 which is a subsidiary of Adecco Group.  Adecco Group is listed 
on the SIX Swiss Exchange (symbol: ADEN).130  Again, because of the size 
of the corporate parent, financials for Special Counsel are not disclosed.  
That said, Special Counsel now has thirty-six offices in the United States.131 
As substantial as these contract attorney registry companies appear, they 
are increasingly competing against legal process outsourcers (LPO), who 
provide the same staffing and process services for large legal transactions 
and litigation matters, yet accomplish it with foreign lawyers.132  In terms of 
tracking industry trends, this creates difficulties for us because only the 
domestic component of a global supply chain will appear in a dataset like 
County Business Patterns.133  So, an increase of 14,000 domestic workers in 
the All Other Legal Services subsector may actually correspond to a much 
larger multiple when the global workforce is considered. 
One of the most well-known LPOs is Pangea3, which was started in 
2003 by a U.S. lawyer and his Indian-American M.B.A. counterpart with 
$1.5 million in venture capital funding.134  The company was subsequently 
purchased by Thomson Reuters (NYSE symbol: TRI) in 2010 for a deal 
rumored to be worth between $35–40 million.135  At the time, the company 
 127.  Investor Center, ROBERT HALF INT’L, http://www.rhi.com/InvestorCenter (last visited Sept. 
30, 2012). 
 128.  About Special Counsel, SPECIAL COUNSEL, http://www.specialcounsel.com/about-special-
counsel/ (last visited Sept. 30, 2012). 
 129.  Id.  
 130.  Who We Are and What We Do, ADECCO GROUP, http://www.adecco.com/en-
US/About/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Sept. 30, 2012). 
 131.  Office Locations, SPECIAL COUNSEL, http://www.specialcounsel.com/locations/ (last visited 
Sept. 30, 2012). 
 132.  See Rachel M. Zahorsky, Vendor or Competitor? Pangea3 Purchase Pleases Some, Worries 
Others, A.B.A. J. (Feb. 1, 2011, 1:50 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/ 
vendor_or_competitor. 
 133.  See County Business Patterns, CENTER FOR TRANSP. RES. & EDUC., 
http://www.ctre.iastate.edu/research/bts_wb/cd-rom/employment/cbp.htm (last visited Sept. 30, 
2012). 
 134.  Anuj Agrawal, In Conversation: Sanjay Kamlani and David Perla, co-CEO’s of Pangea3, 
BAR & BENCH (Jun. 27, 2012), http://barandbench.com/brief/4/2540/1/in-conversation-sanjay-
kamlani-and-david-perla-co-ceos-of-pangea3 (reporting on growth of LPO from a start-up in 2004 to 
850 lawyers currently and projected growth of 40% to 60% per year).   
 135.  See Thomson Reuters Acquires Indian Legal Outsourcing Co. Pangea3, A.B.A. J. (Nov. 18, 
2010, 4:25 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/report_thomson_reuters_to_acquire_ 
indian_legal_outsourcing_co_pangea3/.  
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had $25 million in annual revenue and electronic discovery was reported to 
be its “biggest piece of business.”136  Thomson Reuters maintained the 
company’s management team after the acquisition.137  With core operations 
in Mumbai, additional facilities in Dehli, India, and Dallas, Texas, and 
corporate headquarters in New York City,138 Pangea3 has consistently grown 
between 40% and 60% per year.139  It now employs over 850 lawyers 
worldwide, and the company expects its historical growth rate to continue 
for the next several years.140 
The Pangea3 growth rate is slightly ahead of the 30% pace reported by 
Mindcrest, a U.S.-based LPO with 600 attorneys in the United States and 
India.141  Mindcrest was founded by a former partner at McGuireWoods, an 
Am Law 200 firm.  Other companies operating in this space include 
UnitedLex, which does e-discovery work along with contract and 
intellectual property portfolio management.142  Recently, UnitedLex was 
listed on the Inc. magazine’s list of the 500 Fastest Growing Private 
Companies, with sales growth of 1,287% over three years.143  UnitedLex has 
750 employees, including 650 in India.144  CPA Global is another LPO that 
does work in document review, legal research, patent portfolios, and 
trademark renewals.  It employs 1,500 people in 17 locations throughout the 
world.145  In early 2012, CPA Global was acquired by Cinven, a European 
private equity firm.146  A fourth large company in this space is Huron 
Consulting Group, a publicly traded company (NASDAQ symbol: HURN)147 
 136.  Agrawal, supra note 134.   
 137.  Id. 
 138.  See About Us, PANGEA3, http://www.pangea3.com/about/company-overview.html (last 
visited Sept. 30, 2012). 
 139.  Agrawal, supra note 134. 
 140.  Id.   
 141.  Aesha Datta, Fresh Law Grads Find Yet Another Avenue in Legal Process Outsourcers, THE 
HINDU BUS. LINE (May 11, 2012), http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/industry-and-
economy/article3408624.ece?ref=wl_opinion.  
 142.  See generally UNITEDLEX, http://www.unitedlex.com/ (last visited Sept. 30, 2011).  
 143.  See Press Release, UnitedLex, UnitedLex Makes Inc. Magazine's 2012 Inc. 500 List of the 
Nation's Fastest-Growing Private Companies (Aug. 21, 2012), available at 
http://www.unitedlex.com/pr_inc500_082112.shtml.  
 144.  See UnitedLex Expects 80% Revenue Growth this Fiscal, THE ECON. TIMES (Jan. 22, 2012, 
4:45 PM), http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2012-01-22/news/30652828_1_unitedlex-
anayltics-clients.   
 145.  Press Release, CPA Global, Cinven to Acquire CPA Global (Jan. 18, 2012), 
http://www.cpaglobal.com/media_centre/press_releases/5046/cinven_to_acquire_cpa_global 
(reporting on locations of CPA Global). 
 146.  Id. 
 147.  See generally HURON CONSULTING GROUP, http://www.huronconsultinggroupusa.com/ (last 
visited Nov. 11, 2012). 
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which recently issued a press release announcing a new document review 
and data operations facility in Gurgeon, India (a booming suburb of 
Delhi).148  The press release reads, “The Company offers around-the-clock 
global discovery support with 1,500 seats at nine locations across the U.S., 
U.K., and India to address clients’ complex business needs.”149  Huron 
Consulting Group’s revenues have increased from $314.6 million in 2007 to 
$606.3 million in 2011.150 
Although the legal market is terrible for law graduates in the United 
States,151 the market is booming for Indian law graduates.152  Why?  Because 
LPOs are growing very rapidly and competing with the traditional Indian 
legal employers.153  Although we might be tempted to assume these jobs are 
highly repetitive and mundane, that may not be the case.154  As the LPOs 
have become larger, more sophisticated, more stable, and more global in 
reach, the competitive advantage has begun to switch from labor arbitrage to 
process engineering.155  In a May 2012 story in the Hindu Business Line, an 
Indian law professor was quoted, “There is a rising trend of students opting 
for LPOs.  The nature of work is changing and these places offer good 
packages and work culture.  Moreover, I believe, promotions also come 
faster in LPOs.”156 
The attractiveness of LPOs is corroborated by the experience of 
Pangea3, which had a retention rate of 94% after its first year of operation.157  
David Perla, a Penn Law grad and co-CEO of Pangea3, recently remarked to 
an Indian publication: 
[E]very year you see surveys about how law students perceive 
LPOs and every year you see more and more law students saying “I 
view an LPO as a good career opportunity.”  Today I think it is up 
to 50 or 60 percent of law students looking at LPOs as a possible 
 148.  See Press Release, Huron Consulting Group, Huron Consulting Group Expands Global E-
Discovery Offerings with India Document Review and Data Operations Facility (July 17, 2012), 
http://ir.huronconsultinggroup.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=180006&p=RssLanding&cat=news&id=17152
46. 
 149.  Id. 
 150.  See Huron Consulting Group Fact Sheet, HURON CONSULTING GROUP 1 (2012), 
http://www.huronconsultinggroup.com/library/Huron_factsheet.pdf.  
 151.  See Joe Palazzolo, Law Grads Face Brutal Job Market, WALL ST. J. (June 25, 2012, 10:18 
AM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100001424052702304458604577486623469958142.html. 
 152.  See Mihaela Papa & David B. Wilkins, Globalization, Lawyers, and India: Toward a 
Theoretical Synthesis of Globalization Studies and the Sociology of the Legal Profession, 18 INT’L. 
J. LEGAL PROF., no. 3, 2011 at 175, 175. 
 153.  Id. at 187. 
 154.  See Alex Hamilton & Kevin Colangelo, Making LPO Work, OUTSOURCE MAG. (July 3, 
2012), http://outsourcemagazine.co.uk/articles/item/4579-making-lpo-work. 
 155.  See Papa & Wilkins, supra note 152, at 180. 
 156.  Datta, supra note 141. 
 157.  Agrawal, supra note 134.   
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career opportunity.  This is quite substantial in 5 years where they 
might have perceived it as “another call centre”.158 
These developments should get our attention.  The work Perla is 
describing is formerly labor-intensive work that has traditionally been 
performed by entry-level United States law school graduates.159  It is now 
being done by Indian law graduates, who are learning how to design and 
operate processes that extract useful information from large masses of digital 
text.  Not only are the Indian law graduates getting the employment, they are 
learning valuable skills that are entirely—entirely—absent from U.S. law 
schools.  A recent article in Managing Partner magazine acknowledged that 
LPOs are taking market share away from U.S. law firms, as more general 
counsel instruct LPOs directly.160  Savings are perceived to be in the 50% 
range.161  According to the story, legal process outsourcing is currently a $1 
billion industry and “is forecast to double in size in the next two to three 
years.”162 
Another industry that reflects Susskind’s view of the future is the 
emerging industry loosely called “predictive coding.”163  In essence, it is 
machine algorithms partially replacing humans altogether in the search for 
relevant information.164  Because of the massive explosion of digital data, 
where so much of our daily lives is encoded into emails, text messages, 
internal knowledge management platforms designed to replace email, and 
digitized voice mail, the scope of discovery in civil or white collar litigation 
has become prohibitively expensive using traditional methods of review.165 
In a recent federal court decision, United States Magistrate Judge 
Andrew J. Peck ruled that a predictive coding algorithm was, on the facts 
before him, an acceptable substitute for manual review.166  Judge Peck 
favorably cited one study that compared two computer algorithms against 
human review, finding that the two computer searches were at least as 
 158.  Id.  
 159.  See Papa & Wilkins, supra note 152, at 184. 
 160.  See Law Firms Are Losing Work to LPO Providers, MANAGING PARTNER (Sept. 3, 2012), 
http://www.managingpartner.com/news/business-strategy/law-firms-are-losing-work-lpo-providers.  
 161.  Id. 
 162.  Id. 
 163.  See Melissa Whittingham, Edward H. Rippey & Skye L. Perryman, Predictive Coding: E-
Discovery Game Changer?, EDDE J., Sep. 23, 2011, at 11. 
 164.  Id.  
 165.  See id. at 14 (discussing the potential price structure of predictive coding services). 
 166.  See Da Silva Moore v. Publicis Groupe, No. 11 Civ. 1279 (ALC), 2012 WL 607412, at *1 
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2012) (recognizing that “computer-assisted review is an acceptable way to search 
for relevant ESI in appropriate cases”).   
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accurate as lawyers.167  Judge Peck also favorably cited another study, which 
found that “[t]he technology-assisted reviews require, on average, human 
review of only 1.9% of the documents, a fifty-fold savings over exhaustive 
manual review.”168  The combination of accuracy and cost made predictive 
coding judicially reasonable under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 1, which 
mandates the courts “secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination” 
of lawsuits.169  Judge Peck’s decision has been designated as a landmark 
ruling by some members of the legal press.170 
Companies operating in the predictive coding space include 
Recommind, which specializes in e-discovery, compliance, and information 
management.171  It explicitly offers “products” for searching and analyzing 
large volumes of information.172  Recommind has approximately $15 million 
in annual revenues and approximately 100 employees spread over facilities 
in Massachusetts, California, London, Germany, and Australia.173  Kroll 
Ontrack is another e-discovery company that offers predictive coding.  Kroll 
Ontrack, which started as a hard disk recovery service, evolved into the e-
discovery and information management services.174  It now employs 1,500 
workers in eleven U.S. and nineteen foreign locations around the world.  In 
2010, Kroll Ontrack had revenues of $250 million.  Kroll Ontrack is a 
subsidiary of Kroll Inc., which is a global risk consulting firm.175  Kroll Inc. 
was recently acquired by Altegrity, which is a conglomerate that owns a 
series of companies specializing in information management.176  Altegrity is 
owned by the Providence Equity Partners, a private equity fund with over 
 167.  See Da Silva Moore, 2012 WL 607412, at *9 & n.11 (citing Herbert L. Roitblatt, Anne 
Kershaw, & Patrick Oot, Document Categorization in Legal Electronic Discovery: Computer 
Classification v. Manual Review, 61 J. AM. SOC’Y FOR INFO. SCI. & TECH. 70, 79 (2010)). 
 168.  Id. at 9 (quoting Maura R. Grossman & Gordon V. Cormack, Technology-Assisted Review in 
E-Discovery Can Be More Effective and More Efficient Than Exhaustive Manual Review, 17 RICH. 
J.L. & TECH. 11, 43 (2011)). 
 169.  FED. R. CIV. P. 1. 
 170.  See Allison Frankel, In E-Discovery Breakthrough, Judge Endorse ‘Predictive Coding,” On 
the Case, THOMSON REUTERS NEWS & INSIGHT, Feb. 27, 2012, available at 
http://newsandinsight.thompsonreuters.com/Legal/News/ViewNews.aspx?id=40579&terms=@Reute
rsTopicCodes+CONTAINS+’ANV’ (referring to Judge Peck’s ruling as a “landmark e-discovery 
decision”). 
 171.  See generally RECOMMIND, http://www.recommind.com/ (last visited Sep. 30, 2012). 
 172.  Id.  
 173.  See InsideView, RECOMMIND, INC., http://www.insideview.com/directory/recommind-inc 
(last visited Nov. 13, 2012).  
 174.  See History, KROLLONTRACK.COM, http://www.krollontrack.com/company/history/ (last 
visited Sept. 30, 2012). 
 175.  See Overview, KROLL ONTRACK, http://www.krollontrack.com/company/overview (last 
visited Oct. 3, 2012). 
 176.  See Aaref Hilaly, What’s Next for Kroll Ontrack?, E-DISCOVERY 2.0 (June 8, 2010, 12:31 
PM), http://www.clearwellsystems.com/e-discovery-blog/2010/06/08/what%E2%80%99s-next-for-
kroll-ontrack/ (reporting sale price of $1.13 billion for Kroll, Inc.). 
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$27 billion under management.177 
Finally, outside the realm of sophisticated corporate clients, it is worth 
mentioning LegalZoom, which supplies legal forms and simple instructions 
for a variety of legal needs, including business formation, employment 
agreements, tax forms, trademark registration, copyright registration, 
provisional applications for patents, real estate leases, and more.178  
LegalZoom recently filed its S-1 registration statement with the U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in anticipation of going 
public.179  According to the S-1, the company has served more than two 
million customers since its founding in 2002.180  The filing reports that in 
2011, nine of ten of its surveyed customers said they would recommend 
LegalZoom to their friends and family (and remember, this is in a disclosure 
document subject to federal securities law).181  Last year, 20% of all 
California limited liability companies were formed using Legal Zoom.182 
Indeed, in conjunction with the Pepperdine Law Review symposium that 
solicited this Essay, I found myself in a rental car in southern California 
during the spring of 2012.  The radio was tuned to the Jim Rome Show, 
which is syndicated on over 200 stations nationwide.  During several hours 
of driving, I probably heard a dozen commercials for LegalZoom (I never 
changed the channel because I had never heard legal advertising at anywhere 
near this scale).  According to the SEC filing, the company had $156 million 
in revenue in 2011 and $12 million in profit.183  It is seeking $120 million in 
funding for general corporate purposes.184 
At least for me, Richard Susskind’s ideas are no longer an abstraction.  
All of the companies discussed above are profiting from the migration away 
from bespoke legal work.  As I reflect upon the array of nonlawyer talent 
and capital that has assembled itself into formidable, rapidly growing 
companies, I have a difficult time identifying a realistic stopping point that 
will preserve a domain exclusively for artisan lawyers—i.e., the type of 
training that U.S. law schools ostensibly provide.  It appears that everything 
 177.  About Us, PROVIDENCE EQUITY, http://www.provequity.com/about-us (last visited Oct. 3, 
2012).  
 178.  Our Products & Services, LEGALZOOM, http://www.legalzoom.com/products-and-
services.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2012).  
 179.  See LegalZoom.com, Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1) (May 10, 2012), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1286139/000104746912005763/a2209299zs-1.htm.  
 180.  Id.  
 181.  Id.   
 182.  Id.  
 183.  Id.  
 184.  Id.  
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up until the courthouse door, or the moment when legal advice is 
communicated from the counselor to the client, is an entry point for a legal 
service vendor to become part of the global legal industry supply chain.  The 
debate over Model Rule of Professional Conduct 5.4, which prohibits fee-
splitting with nonlawyers,185 is largely a farce.186  Rule 5.4 is not keeping 
nonlawyers out of the legal industry.  Rather, it is a mental fence that keeps 
lawyers and law professors from venturing out and understanding how the 
world is changing around us. 
III.  A BLUEPRINT FOR CHANGE 
As discussed in Part II, we, the legal professoriate, are facing 
enormously serious structural problems that are likely to accelerate in the 
years to come.  These can be summarized as follows: (1) our costs are high 
and relatively fixed;187 (2) the market for traditional legal jobs appears to 
have plateaued;188 (3) we have excess industry capacity, with a need to fill 
45,000 1L seats each year;189  (4) we are almost entirely dependent on 
federal loans originated by the U.S. Department of Education, which 
exposes us to political winds associated with student indebtedness and 
repayment rates;190  (5) as predicted by Richard Susskind, law is in the early 
stages of a profound and massively disruptive information revolution.191 
As formidable as these challenges might be, I would maintain that our 
biggest challenge is managing ourselves.  We, the tenured law faculty, 
control two of the most important components of any law school’s strategy: 
hiring and curriculum.  We have inexperience in making difficult 
institutional choices and tremendous muscle memory that pulls us back 
toward the illusory comfort of the status quo.  Setting new priorities in this 
environment is mentally and emotionally exhausting.  Further, it is made all 
the more difficult by the uncertainty regarding incentive and status 
 185.  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.4 (1983).  
 186.  See, e.g., Joe Palazzolo, IBM General Counsel: Nonlawyer Ownership Is a Nonstarter, 
WALL ST. J. LAW BLOG (Feb. 14, 2012, 2:22 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2012/02/14/ibm-
general-counsel-nonlawyer-ownership-is-a-nonstarter/ (discussing practicing bars opposition to any 
attempt to enable nonlawyers to own equity in law firms, including proposed changes by the ABA 
Ethics 20/20 Commission); see also Chris Bonjean, ISBA Submits Resolution Regarding ABA’s 
Ethics 20/20, ILL. STATE BAR ASSOC. (Jun. 20, 2012), http://iln.isba.org/blog/2012/06/20/isba-
submits-resolution-regarding-abas-ethics-2020 (reporting on resolution by the Illinois State Bar 
Association, modeled on a 2000 ABA resolution, that “law firms shall not be owned by non-lawyers 
and legal fees shall not be shared with non-lawyers”). 
 187.  See supra Part II.B and text accompanying note 92.  
 188.  See supra Part II.B and Figure 2.   
 189.  See supra Part II.B and Figure 4.  As noted earlier, based on 1L admissions in the fall of 
2010, the spring of 2012 will graduate the largest class in the history of U.S. legal education.  See 
supra note 64 and accompanying text.  
 190.  See notes 63–92 and accompanying text; see also notes 89–92 and accompanying text. 
 191.  See supra Part II.C. 
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structures.  Who is going to bear the costs of retooling?  Is scholarly 
productivity still going to be major part of the reward structure?  If scholarly 
promise is not going to be the primary hiring criteria, what criteria will 
replace it?  These are difficult questions.  But, if an institution is going to get 
itself to safer ground, the answers, and compromises, have to be based on a 
realistic assessment of the future. 
Each law faculty will need to formulate, then adopt and execute, its own 
blueprint for change.  After many months of reflection, I have formulated a 
blueprint for change that is comprised of three concrete steps that I believe 
would help any law school navigate this difficult journey.  These three steps 
are as follows: 
 
(1) Build consortia of law schools that can reliably pull together 
information, resources, and expertise for the purpose of large-scale 
collaborations focused on labor market outcomes.  These consortia 
should be built in conjunction with alumni and employers, who are 
themselves looking for resources and venues that help them 
successfully adapt to a rapidly changing legal marketplace.192 
 
(2) Use the economies of scale and scope of a consortium to begin the 
process of constructing a competency-based curriculum that enables 
students to enter traditional law practice, the Susskind process-
driven world,193 or a third alternative identified and targeted by the 
law school. 
 
(3) Implement a realistic allocation of the retooling burden—what I call 
the “12% solution.” 
 
These steps will be discussed in order in the following three sections of 
Part III. 
A.  Consortium of Law Schools Focused on Labor Market Outcomes 
In Part II, I stated that the financial viability of law schools depends 
upon three interrelated factors: (a) students wishing to enroll, (b) an ability 
to pay, and (c) professional employment at graduation.  Of these factors, 
 192.  Note to Deans: A task-based or mission-based consortium is an effective way to reach out to 
alumni and employers.  It has been my experience that lawyers will support these initiatives with 
both time and money. 
 193.  See supra Part II.C. 
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professional employment is the most important because, if present, the first 
two factors will take care of themselves.  Building a pipeline to desirable 
professional employment is a complicated undertaking.  Further, for some of 
my colleagues, this proposal is going to smack of vocational training, which 
is a serious criticism that warrants a serious response.  Therefore, in this 
section, I address both the complexity issue and the vocationalism critique. 
With that explanation in mind, I want to be very explicit about the 
engine that underlies my Blueprint for Change.  It is labor market outcomes.  
A simple, stylized example illustrates their importance.  Imagine students 
from Law School A, who have the benefit of a competency-based 
curriculum, and students from rival Law School B, who receive a traditional 
legal education that is unstructured after the 1L year.  Now consider legal 
employers in the current economic environment, who are under enormous 
and unprecedented economic pressure.194  If graduates of Law School A, as a 
group, consistently outperform graduates of Law School B, graduates of 
Law School A will over time receive a disproportionate share of the 
available employment opportunities.  Because law students want to be 
heavily pursued by employers, Law School A also receives a 
disproportionate share of law school applications.  In short, Law School A 
would enjoy market power in both the admissions and employments sides of 
its operations.195 
Changing employer behavior is complicated, particularly in the legal 
market, where reliance on an ingrained prestige hierarchy produced a 
century of steadily growing profits.196  But as discussed in Part II, those 
underlying economic conditions are undergoing dramatic change.  That is 
our opening.  Yet, it is much too big a job for a single law school.  Changing 
employer behavior requires (1) a lot of current knowledge on the legal 
marketplace, (2) deep relationships with legal employers who are willing to 
experiment, (3) an agreed upon specification of high performance, (4) a 
critical mass of law professors willing to build and teach a curriculum 
designed to produce high performers, and (5) a reliable system of 
measurement that can quantify the value-add.  I doubt any one law school 
has the resources and personnel to accomplish this at a world class level.  A 
 194.  See Henderson, Three Generations, supra note 6, at 381 (discussing how forces of supply 
and demand have dramatically shifted in favor of large corporate clients and that this imbalance is 
reshaping the legal marketplace). 
 195.  Such market power is currently enjoyed by the elite national law schools.  But is it 
warranted?  At least some legal employers fighting over market share will be willing to look at the 
data.  Cf. William D. Henderson, Law Firm Strategies for Human Capital: Past, Present, Future, in 
52 STUDIES IN LAW, POLITICS, AND SOCIETY 73, 100 (Austin Sarat ed., 2010) (discussing coming 
battle over market share among large U.S. law firms and necessity of firms to reexamine their human 
capital strategies in order to compete). 
 196.  See id. at 74 (attributing lack of innovation in human capital strategies to a perennial rise in 
private practice incomes and historical reliance on national law schools and noting, “If the model is 
not broken, the adage runs, why fix it?”). 
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consortium of law schools, in contrast, would have a much better shot. 
Over the last several decades, as law schools have become increasingly 
embedded inside universities, law professors have bristled at the thought of 
education and training that was designed to meet the needs of the 
marketplace.197  I have three responses to this perspective. 
First, the types of education that will attain the highest valuation are 
complex problem-solving skills that enable law school graduates to 
communicate and collaborate in a highly complex, globalized environment.  
This is not vocational training; it is the creation of a new model of 
professional education that better prepares our graduates for the daunting 
political and economic challenges ahead.  And it should be obvious that as a 
group, we legal academics lack these skills ourselves.  Although we could 
fix that.  The consortium would provide the resources to retool. 
Second, we academics are on thin ground when we claim that we must 
operate apart from market influences in order to develop critical thinking 
among our students.  Many colleagues are likely to argue that law is the 
primary mechanism for controlling the negative externalities of market 
forces and market failures; therefore, it is worrisome when legal education is 
designed with an eye toward the marketplace. 
This critique has undeniable merit, but it should not be controlling.  
Whether we like it or not, we already operate within a market.  Indeed, for 
the last several decades, there has been a vibrant lateral market for law 
professors that has ratcheted up law professor salaries.198  Virtually every 
law dean in the nation has had the experience of being asked to “meet the 
market” to retain his or her most well-known and productive faculty 
members.  Indeed, it is now conventional wisdom that the best way to 
receive a large pay increase is to obtain a lateral offer from a rival law 
school.  Further, within the university, our higher base salaries are justified 
based on the opportunity cost of private practice income.  At the same time, 
there is a glut in the market for entry level law graduates. Further, virtually 
all lack the skills needed to differentiate themselves or to be economically 
valuable to an employer or client without additional training.  We cannot 
credibly accept the benefits of market forces without also accepting the 
burdens. 
 197.  According to historian Robert Stevens, this has been a persistent tension in university-based 
legal education.  See STEVENS, supra note 13, at 209-211, 264-65 (discussing the resistance to so-
called “Hessian training” by the professoriate trying to establish the primacy of scholarship with the 
nation’s leading law schools).  
 198.  See, e.g., Clayton P Gillette, Law School Faculty as Free Agents, 17 J. CONTEMP. L. ISSUES 
213, 214-19 (2008) (observing at least widespread perceptions that lateral movement is more 
common and has likely increased salaries for both mobile and less mobile faculty members). 
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This brings us to the third reason we need to focus on labor market 
outcomes: As discussed in Part II.A, lack of professional employment for 
graduates is the economic force that could put many law schools out of 
business.  Simply stated, the market for traditional legal education is drying 
up.  Yet, legal problems and issues remain.  An education that is attuned to 
this changing marketplace is a valuable education.  Further, in addition to a 
private sector market benefit, such an education is likely to also include the 
knowledge and skills needed to govern and regulate within a complex, 
globalized world. 
It may be useful to step back for a moment and ask ourselves the true 
nature of legal education’s current problems.  Some might argue that it is 
excessively high tuition and debt.  I agree these are serious issues, but not 
the most serious.  I believe the most serious problem is inadequate quality.199  
We can do a lot more with three years of time and $120,000 plus in tuition 
per student.  Moreover, as a matter of public welfare, our society needs these 
problem-solvers. 
This is the type of large gap that only a consortium of law schools 
would be able to fill.  The purpose of such a body is to pool together (a) 
alumni networks, which encompass a wide range of high quality employers, 
and (b) the enthusiastic and innovative faculty members from several 
schools.  Outside of the purview of ordinary faculty governance, this group 
of willing legal educators would have the resources and latitude to create the 
type of curriculum and teaching methods that could attract the interest and 
allegiance of employers who are themselves locked into their own fierce 
battle for market share. 
This cooperative effort might begin as a consortium-based summer 
program for underemployed law students during their first or second 
summer of law school.  If the program is met with enthusiasm by students 
and employers, it could be migrated to consortium-based 2L and 3L 
programs.  As other law faculty see concrete evidence of the success of the 
program and have an opportunity to observe its teaching methods, the 
consortium innovations can be repatriated and scaled back to the home law 
schools. 
The consortium approach has several advantages regarding scale and 
scope.  But its biggest contribution may be sidestepping intractable issues of 
faculty governance. Unlike curricular reform at the school level, which is 
often characterized as being long on discussion and short on actual 
 199.  Cf. William D. Henderson & Rachel Zahorsky, The Pedigree Problem: Are Law School Ties 
Choking the Profession? A.B.A. J., (July 1 2012, 4:20 AM), 
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/the_pedigree_problem_are_law_school_ties_choking_t
he_profession/ (presenting evidence that the labor market’s obsession with prestige—not just large 
law firms, but also federal judges, federal agencies, and public interest organizations—inhibits 
innovation in legal education). 
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change,200 a dean has the latitude to commit one or two enthusiastic faculty 
members to a consortium effort that will build and experiment with new 
approaches to legal education.  More significantly, the resulting consortium 
faculty would be a veritable dream team for rapid trial-and-error innovation.  
Within one or two years, the consortium moves from ideas to actual results.  
And, if it works, results are successes that resonate with students, employers, 
and alumni.  Within each law school faculty, these successes are likely to 
produce converts to the new approach and accelerate the overall rate of 
adoption, especially if the current economic climate for law school graduates 
continues. 
Finally, there is nothing in the consortium approach described above 
that would urge a law school not to experiment with its own non-consortium 
initiatives.  Rather, the consortium approach brings to bear the greatest 
amount of talent and resources with the fewest number of institutional 
roadblocks.  Indeed, if a law school dean has a handful of faculty members 
who are willing to commit to it, it becomes a relatively low-cost hedging 
strategy that is worth pursuing. 
B.  A Competency-Based Curriculum 
The key to moving an entry level labor market is clarity between 
educators and employers on the requisite knowledge, skills, values, and 
behaviors that amount to high performance.  Very few legal employers, 
including law firms, government agencies, and corporate legal departments, 
have analyzed their human capital in a sophisticated way.201  Therefore, in 
most cases, a dialogue on this topic will be strategic and mutually 
advantageous for all parties involved.  After defining the criteria for high 
 200.  See, e.g., Robert F. Blomquist, Some Thoughts on Law School Curriculum Reform: Scaling 
the Mountainside, 29 VAL. U. L. REV. 641 (1995) (analogizing the law school curriculum to a 
mountainside that changes at a very slow pace). 
 201.  A handful of law firm partners and law firm professional development practitioners 
comprise the field.  See, e.g., SCOTT WESTFAHL, YOU GET WHAT YOU MEASURE: LAWYER 
DEVELOPMENT FRAMEWORKS & EFFECTIVE PERFORMANCE EVALUATIONS (NALP  2008) (authored 
by Director of Professional Development at Goodwin Proctor); JOAN C. WILLIAMS, FAIR MEASURE: 
TOWARD EFFECTIVE ATTORNEY EVALUATIONS (ABA Commission on Women in the Profession, 2d 
ed. 2008); HEATHER BOCK & ROBERT RUYAK, CONSTRUCTING CORE COMPETENCIES: USING 
COMPETENCY MODELS TO MANAGE FIRM TALENT (ABA 2006) (authored by Managing Partner and 
Head of Professional Development at the now defunct Howrey LLP law firm); PETER B. SLOAN, 
FROM CLASSES TO COMPETENCIES, LOCKSTEPS TO LEVELS: HOW ONE LAW FIRM DISCARDED 
LOCKSTEP ASSOCIATE ADVANCEMENT & REPLACED IT WITH AN ASSOCIATE LEVEL SYSTEM (2007) 
(authored by partner at Blackwell Sanders).  That said, in my experience working with legal service 
organizations, a well-designed system only becomes effective when it is properly executed.  This 
requires leadership and attention to culture and incentive structures. 
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performance, the shared goal should be the creation of measurably better 
law school graduates.  With adequate measurement, both employers and 
educators can ascertain the value of the specialized curriculum.  This has the 
potential to change the current focus from cost (“legal education is too 
expensive”) to value (“we want to hire more of your graduates because they 
perform better on the job”). 
What I am advocating is the creation of a competency-based curriculum.  
In a competency-based curriculum, we identify the knowledge, skills, 
behaviors, and attributes of highly successful professionals—lawyers and 
nonlawyers—and then work backwards.202  This can be summarized in five 
sequential steps: 
 
(1) In conjunction with a group of alumni and employers pulled 
together through a consortium of law schools, identify examples of 
professional excellence in both the new and old legal economies. 
 
(2) Break these examples into discrete domains of knowledge, skills, 
and behaviors, identifying both the overlaps and distinctive features 
of specific practice areas.  Industrial and organizational psychology 
provides the methodology, which has been applied in virtually all 
industries.203 
 
(3) Use the iterative process of theory and data to determine the most 
effective ways to sequence and teach the requisite knowledge, 
skills, behaviors, and competencies.204 
 
(4) Measure the post-graduate performance of students who have had 
the benefit of this education (a summer program that eventually 
evolves into a curricular program at individual law schools) against 
the post-graduate performance of law students who received a 
traditional J.D. education. 
 
(5) Build feedback loops on the student, faculty, and employer 
experience, evaluate program and repeat.  Yes, that’s right, repeat.  
Version 1.0 won’t be nearly good enough. 
 
 202.  In the adult learning literature, this process is akin to the creation of an “impact map,” which 
works backward from outcome to measurement, action, and required skill or knowledge.  See, e.g., 
ROBERT O. BRINKERHOFF & ANNE M. APKING, HIGH IMPACT LEARNING: STRATEGIES FOR 
LEVERAGING BUSINESS RESULTS FROM TRAINING ch. 4 (2001).   
 203.  See, e.g., LYLE M. SPENCER, JR. & SIGNE M. SPENCER, COMPETENCE AT WORK: MODELS 
FOR SUPERIOR PERFORMANCE (1993). 
 204.  See id. at 153–155. 
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The above five-step process contains a critical assumption: that 
students’ professional potential is not substantially fixed by incoming 
academic credentials.  Stated another way, it is possible for a student who 
receives three years of an outstanding competency-based education to obtain 
a permanent, sustainable advantage over a more academically qualified 
student who received a traditional—and therefore largely unstructured—
legal education.205  If an educational program can produce a measurable 
value-add that another school cannot reliably produce, employers will seek 
out the graduates of such a program; students will seek out admission; and 
alumni will want to contribute time and money toward its construction and 
improvement. 
A real world example of transformative education is the late Randy 
Pausch’s Entertainment Technology Center at Carnegie Mellon 
University.206  The Center supervised a two-year masters degree that taught 
students how to combine art with technology in pursuit of entertainment.207  
The massive creativity that this program generated led to companies making 
three year commitments to hire its graduates.208  As Pausch wrote, this meant 
that employers “were promising to hire people we hadn’t even admitted 
yet.”209 
No doubt, some would argue that law is different.210  In my experience, 
many law professors believe in the determinative power of general 
intelligence—that is, the quality of one’s legal education cannot significantly 
reorder the sorting of quality of innate ability (LSAT and undergraduate 
credentials) that occurs in the admissions process.211  As one law professor 
once told me, “I can’t teach ‘smart.’”  For educators in this group, a 
 205.  See id. at Part V. 
 206.  See RANDY PAUSCH, THE LAST LECTURE 124 (2008).  
 207.  Program Overview, ENTERTAINMENT TECHNOLOGY CENTER CARNEGIE MELLON, 
http://www.etc.cmu.edu/site/program/ (last visited Sept. 28, 2012).  
 208.  See PAUSCH, supra note 206, at 125. 
 209.  Id. 
 210.  See Jason A. Smith, Training Individuals in Public Health Law, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 
(SPECIAL ISSUE) 50, 52–53 (2008). (“Competency-based training is foreign to legal education and 
practice. . . .  Formal legal education is fundamental to learning.”). 
 211.  At least one scholar has made the observation that U.S. News & World Report rankings do 
not measure educational quality; rather, the primary function of ranking is to sort the quality of raw 
material.  See Russell Korobkin, Harnessing the Positive Power of Rankings: A Response to Posner 
and Sunstein, 81 IND. L.J. 35, 40–43 (2006) [hereinafter Korobkin, Harnessing] (observing that 
rankings don’t assess educational quality by providing a market-clearing device that enables top law 
students and legal employers to identify each other, thus augmenting “employment opportunities and 
. . . long-term earning potential” for prospective law school applicants); see also Russell Korobkin, 
Essay, In Praise Of Law School Rankings: Solutions To Coordination And Collective Action 
Problems, 77 TEX. L. REV. 403, 407–14 (1998). 
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competency-based curriculum is unlikely to hold much appeal.212  The 
quality of the input compromises and largely predetermines the quality of 
the output. 
That said, it is not a productive use of our time to debate whether this 
worldview is correct.213  How much value a competency-based curriculum 
can add, if any, is an empirical question that needs to be answered with 
data.214  We answer this question by building such a curriculum and 
observing the results; the control group will be comprised of the large 
number of law schools who lack the leadership and imagination to break 
from the status quo.215  It is just that simple. 
There is a paucity of high quality empirical research on the factors that 
contribute to lawyer effectiveness.216  But what little evidence there is 
suggests that academic indicators are less important than what some of us 
law professors might believe.217 
The leading study on this topic was conducted by Professors Marjorie 
Shultz and Sheldon Zedeck of the University of California at Berkeley.218  
The study was partially inspired by the passage of Proposition 209 in the 
mid-1990s, which made it illegal for California state colleges and 
universities to use racial preferences in their admissions.219  Based on twenty 
years of teaching experience at U.C. Berkeley Law, Professor Shultz was 
skeptical that the admissions criteria used for admission to law school—the 
LSAT and undergraduate GPA (UGPA), which have significant racial 
performance disparities—were valid and reliable predictors of future success 
 212.  See generally Korobkin, Harnessing, supra note 211 (discussing the value of law school 
rankings as a logical coordination system and arguing that faculty scholarship, the traditional 
approach to legal education, is one of the most important factors for the ranking system). 
 213.  For my view on the potential of legal education to transform, see Henderson & Zahorsky, 
The Pedigree Problem, supra note 199 (reviewing evidence that law school pedigree fails to predict 
success as a lawyer). 
 214.  In his recent best-selling book, the Nobel Laureate Daniel Kahneman marshals a wealth of 
research to document humankind’s propensity toward overconfidence.  See DANIEL KAHNEMAN, 
THINKING, FAST AND SLOW chs. 19–24 (2011).  We don’t bother collecting data and testing our 
assumptions, because we are so certain we are correct.  Id.  This propensity produces a relentless 
stream of bad decisions.  Id. 
 215.  See supra Part III.B. 
 216.  See generally Marjorie Shultz & Sheldon Zedeck, Identification, Development, and 
Validation of Predictors for Successful Lawyering, Final Report (Sept. 2008) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with U.C. Berkeley School of Law, University of California, Berkeley) 
[hereinafter Shultz & Zedeck, Identification, Development, and Validation] (demonstrating the lack 
of empirical research and analyzing factors that contribute to lawyer effectiveness in an official 
report commissioned by LSAC). 
 217.  Id. at 15–18. 
 218.  See Marjorie Shultz & Sheldon Zedeck, Predicting Lawyer Effectiveness: Broadening the 
Basis for Law School Admissions Decisions, 36 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 620 (2011) [hereinafter Shultz 
& Zedeck, Predicting Lawyer Effectiveness]. 
 219.  See Shultz & Zedeck, Identification, Development, and Validation, supra note 216, at 66, 
n.8; see also CAL. CONST. art. I, §31 (codifying Proposition 209).  
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as a practicing lawyer.220  To test this theory, Professor Shultz enlisted the 
help of Professor Zedeck, who is one of the nation’s leading industrial and 
organizational (IO) psychologists.221 
Drawing upon well-established IO psychology empirical methods, 
Shultz and Zedeck identified twenty-six lawyer effectiveness factors.222  
These factors, which are grouped into eight umbrella categories,223 are 
summarized in Figure 9 below. 
 
Figure 9.  Shultz and Zedeck Lawyer Effectiveness Factors 
Intellectual & Cognitive 
• Analysis and Reasoning 
• Creativity and Innovation 
• Problem Solving 
• Practical Judgment 
Research & Information Gathering 
• Researching the Law 
• Fact Finding 
• Questioning and Interviewing 
Communications 
• Influencing and Advocating 
• Writing 
• Speaking 
• Listening 
Planning & Organization 
• Strategic Planning 
• Organizing/Managing One’s Own 
Work 
• Organizing/Managing Others 
(Staff/Colleagues) 
Conflict Resolution 
• Negotiation Skills 
• Able to See the World Through the 
Eyes of Others 
Client/Business Relations: 
Entrepreneurship 
• Networking and Business 
Development 
• Providing Advice and Counsel and 
Building Relationships with Clients 
Working with Others 
• Developing Relationships Within 
the Legal Profession 
• Evaluation, Development, and 
Mentoring 
Character 
• Passion and Engagement 
• Diligence 
• Integrity/Honesty 
• Stress Management 
• Community Involvement and Ser-
vice 
• Self-Development 
Part of the Shultz-Zedeck project included the development of 
behaviorally anchored scales for measuring performance on a one-to-five 
scale on each of the twenty-six effectiveness factors.224  These scales were 
empirically derived from extensive lawyer interviews and focus groups and 
 220.  Shultz & Zedeck, Predicting Lawyer Effectiveness, supra note 218, at 623. 
 221.  As evidence of this claim, note that Professor Zedeck is the Editor-in-Chief of the American 
Psychological Association’s HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY 
(2010). 
 222.  See Shultz & Zedeck, Predicting Lawyer Effectiveness, supra note 218, at 630. 
 223.  Id. at 640–41. 
 224.  Id. at 629. 
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then tested to ensure their reliability and validity among lawyer evaluators.225  
These scales were then used to obtain peer and supervisor evaluations for 
1,150 U.C. Berkeley and U.C. Hastings graduates and 200 U.C. Berkeley 
alumni who graduated law school between 1973 and 2006.226  These 
effectiveness factors were only weakly correlated with student and alumni 
LSAT, UGPA, and first-year grades—and some of these correlations were 
negative.227  In contrast, other assessment tools were positively and more 
strongly correlated with a significantly larger number of effectiveness 
factors.228  These nonacademic assessment tools included biographical 
information data (positively correlated with twenty-four factors), a 
situational judgment test (twenty-three factors), and a well-known off-the-
shelf Big Five personality test (twenty-two factors).229 
Indirectly, the Shultz-Zedeck study also revealed the unduly narrow 
scope of the traditional law school curriculum.230  Despite the fact that 
nonacademic assessments were useful predictors of actual lawyer 
effectiveness, these assessments added no incremental value to predictions 
of first-year grades beyond what LSAT and UGPA were already able to 
predict.231  Yet, as Shultz and Zedeck pointed out, this negligible predictive 
power is likely due to the fact that law school, particularly in the first year, 
assesses “a narrow band of cognitive test taking skills,”232 which is a small 
fraction of the twenty-six effectiveness factors. 
The original purpose of the Shultz-Zedeck study was to develop more 
accurate and valid methods for making law school admissions.233  Yet the 
study ultimately delivered much more.  One of these takeaways is that 
traditional academic predictors capture a mere subset of what enables a 
lawyer to be effective.234  A second key takeaway is that most of the 
 225.  Id. 
 226.  See id. at 639.   
 227.  Id. at 641 (reporting that only eight out of twenty-six effectiveness factors were positively 
correlated at statistically significant levels with the LSAT, ranging from .07 (Problem Solving) to 
.15 (Writing); reporting statistically significant negative correlations between LSAT and Networking 
and Business Development (-.12) and Community Service (-.10); reporting statistically significant 
correlation between UGPA and three effectiveness factors); see also Shultz & Zedeck, Identification, 
Development, and Validation, supra note 216 (in student sample, reporting no statistically 
significant positive correlations between UPGA and effectiveness factors, but observing a negative 
association between Practical Judgment (-.169), Seeing the World Through the Eyes of Others (-
.170), Developing Relationships (-.195), Integrity (-.189) and Community Service (-.152)) (data 
taken from correlation tables in appendices).  
 228.  See Shutlz & Zedeck, Predicting Lawyer Effectiveness, supra note 218, at 634. 
 229.  See id. at 643.  The personality assessment was the Hogan Personality Inventory (HPI).  The 
Hogan Developmental Survey, which focuses on job “derailers,” was meaningfully correlated with 
eighteen factors, albeit most negatively. 
 230.  See Shultz & Zedeck, Identification, Development, and Validation, supra note 216, at 88. 
 231.  Id. at 65. 
 232.  See Shutlz & Zedeck, Predicting Lawyer Effectiveness, supra note 218, at 643. 
 233.  See id. at 628. 
 234.  Id. at 641. 
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traditional law school curriculum has little or no overlap with most of the 
Shultz-Zedeck effectiveness favors.235  Lacking awareness that these factors 
are even important, we legal educators spend a lot of time disseminating 
substantive legal knowledge and developing a relatively small number of 
effectiveness skills.236  As a consequence, we spend virtually no time or 
concentrated effort on other skills.  Indeed, it is fair to ask whether we law 
professors, as a group, have developed many of the requisite effectiveness 
factors.  Are we good at networking or developing relationship within the 
legal profession?  Or seeing the world through the eyes of others?  Or 
strategic planning?  As embarrassing as this might seem, these deficits may 
be our greatest opportunity. 
Building a competency-based curriculum is complicated.237  A single 
faculty member cannot design it within the confines of a single essay; it is a 
task that, in its first permutation, requires the efforts of a large number of 
faculty, social scientists, and practicing lawyers over an extended period of 
time.  The complexity of a competency-based curriculum is further 
compounded by an information revolution that is changing the mix of 
current and future jobs.  Because of the emphasis on process and technology 
now taking hold within the legal industry,238 the practical technical skills and 
domain knowledge that might have held us in good stead in 1980 or 1990 
may be inadequate for a large proportion of law students graduating in the 
year 2015.239 
Drawing upon my ongoing research, my experience building 
competency-based curricula at Indiana Law, and my related work with law 
firms and legal departments, I would offer three guiding principles for 
building a competency-based curriculum: 
(1) “Practice-Ready” is Not Enough.  Despite the rebukes often 
received from the practicing bar, for most law schools an emphasis on 
“practice-ready” skills will be insufficient to cope with the structural 
changes occurring within the legal industry.240  Granted, it is true that better 
 235.  Id. 
 236.  See id. at 623. 
 237.  See SPENCER & SPENCER, supra note 203 (summarizing hundreds of research studies from a 
twenty-year time span on competency assessment and application). 
 238.  See supra Part II.C. 
 239.  The IO psychology literature provides some clues on competencies that cut across all 
workplaces.  See, e.g., SPENCER & SPENCER, supra note 203, at 336 (listing eight factors that 
“predict success in work and in life”: achievement orientation, initiative, information seeking, 
conceptual thinking, interpersonal understanding, self-confidence, impact and influence, and 
collaborativeness). 
 240.  Several practicing lawyers with adjunct professorships in law schools have advocated for a 
curriculum that would enable law students to be more practice ready at graduation.  See, e.g., Brent 
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skills training will enable law school graduates to better compete for the 
finite number of traditional legal service jobs that will be available in the 
years to come.241  But, to be blunt, in a world that is getting pulled in 
Susskind’s continuum from bespoke to commoditized, practice-ready skills 
training will not change the total number of traditional legal jobs available to 
law school graduates.  Moreover, one of greatest dangers of the “practice-
ready” solution is that we law professors will too readily conclude that we 
don’t need to leave the building—that is, engage with the profession and the 
industry242— to find a solution.  Our schools would just need to hire more 
clinicians.  Yet, this is a very expensive solution that fails to address the 
longer-term systemic employment problems.243 
(2) Design and Build It Yourself.  What we teach, and how we teach it, 
are the key factors that will enable a law school to distinguish itself in the 
years to come.  Although it might be tempting for a law school committee to 
craft something that is based on the landmark Shultz-Zedeck effectiveness 
factors,244 or purchased from a consultant, the ultimate work product has to 
produce graduates that employers are anxious to hire.  This is a design 
problem that requires data to effectively construct.  We need to know what 
to teach and when and how to teach it.  Indeed, the fifth and final step in 
building a competency-based curriculum is simply “repeat.”  This is why 
engagement with the legal industry is so critical: We need a reliable 
feedback loop.  Equally important in the short term is the fact that the 
process of designing and building a competency-based curriculum is a 
profoundly powerful change management tool.245  With the right leadership, 
Evan Newton, The Ninety-Five Theses: Systemic Reforms of the American Legal Education and 
Licensure, 64 S.C. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012); see also Steven C. Bennett, When Will Law School 
Change?, 89 NEB. L. REV. 87 (2010); see also Jason M. Dolin, Opportunity Lost: How Law School 
Disappoints Law Students, the Public, and the Legal Profession, 44 CAL. W. L. REV. 219 (2007).  I 
applaud the passion and dedication of these lawyers and am sympathetic to many of their critiques.  
But, following their prescriptions will not solve our longer term problems. 
 241.  The soft employment market, however, also provides employers with a temptation to 
double-down on law school pedigree.  See Henderson & Zahorsky, The Pedigree Problem, supra 
note 199.   
 242.  See Part III.A. 
 243.  Cf. TAMANAHA, FAILING supra, note 42, at 172–73 (pointing out that the rise of clinical 
education reflects the error in abandoning the apprenticeship model but arguing that the clinics are 
uneconomical and not a viable solution to legal education’s long-term woes). 
 244.  The Shultz-Zedeck effectiveness factors were not designed to be a working tool for a law 
school curriculum.  My own experience in both a law school and legal employer context is that 
twenty-six factors is too many.  An effective competency-based curriculum will simplify these 
factors and place them in a sequence and hierarchy to facilitate effective teaching. 
 245.  As noted earlier, change management is a well-established discipline with a deep literature.  
See supra note 23 and accompanying text.  For a general discussion on change management, see 
John P. Kotter, Leading Change: Why Transformation Efforts Fail, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan. 2007, at 
96 (articulating and explaining Kotter’s renowned eight principles on organizational change); see 
also Fred Nickols, Change Management 101: A Primer, DISTANCE CONSULTING LLC, 
http://www.nickols.us/change.htm (last updated Aug. 23, 2012) (accessible overview by a leading 
consultant on change management). 
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it can also be the basis for a successful law school capital campaign.  Again, 
engagement with alumni and the legal industry will lead us out of this 
maze.246 
(3) Alliances with Employers.  Law schools have one factor working in 
our favor.  Legal employers are facing a battle over market share,247 and high 
quality professional talent is the solution to their problem.  Legal employers 
lack the know-how and expertise to solve this problem on their own.  
Further, they too are under enormous cost pressures.248  Effective 
engagement with the legal industry can and should result in mutually 
beneficial collaboration.  The value of the third year of law school is now 
almost universally questioned.249  Thus, it is ripe for a law school-legal 
employer collaboration that drives down costs while accelerating lawyer 
development. 
C.  The 12% Solution 
My Blueprint for Change takes a realistic view of how quickly and 
dramatically law schools can change.  Some faculty members may deny 
there is need to change.  Others will disagree with the direction I have staked 
out here.  A third group may like the proposal but conclude that it is too late 
in their careers to make a substantial contribution.  So let’s begin with a 
coalition of the willing.  To my mind, 12% of the faculty is enough, 
particularly if they are pooled together in a consortium-based working group 
as discussed in Part III.A. 
Further, as a political matter, let’s stipulate that the blueprint does not 
call for the tearing down of legal education as we know it.  Instead, we start 
with 12% of the curriculum—the equivalent of one course per year—driven 
by a small subset the faculty, who are willing and able to take up the 
 246.  See supra Part III.A. 
 247.  See Henderson, Law Firm Strategies, supra note 195 (discussing coming battle over market 
share among large U.S. law firms); see also William D. Henderson, From Big Law to Lean Law, 
George Mason Law & Economics Symposium (forthcoming) (on file with author) (describing 
current battle over market share). 
 248.  See, e.g., Dan DiPietro & Gretta Rusanow, Cost Reduction Is Good, Cost is Certainly Better, 
AM. L. DAILY (Dec. 10, 2010, 6:00 AM), http:amlawdaily.typepad.com/amlawdaily/2010/12/citi3 
quarterparttwo.html (“[T]he corporate law department faces pressure internally to reduce its outside 
legal costs.  General counsel have been open to other options given the availability of offshore legal 
service providers, and Am Law Second Hundred firms prepared to offer services at a lower cost than 
the traditional law firms.”). 
 249.  See, e.g., Mitu Gulati, Richard Sander & Robert Sockloskie, The Happy Charade: An 
Empirical Examination of the Third Year of Law School, 51 J. LEGAL EDUC. 235, 244 (2001) 
(among a sample of 1,100 3Ls, the authors “estimate that third-year students at many law schools 
attend only around 60 percent of their large classes.”).  
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challenge.  Because the competencies and learning encompassed by the 12% 
will move students substantially further into the noncognitive effectiveness 
factors identified by Shultz and Zedeck, this 12% change could immediately 
distinguish a school’s graduates from graduates of peer schools.  Thereafter, 
the 12% would provide a basis for additional investment and learning.  
Again, 12% is where we start. 
If 12% seems like too high a price, I would direct your attention to two 
insurmountable problems with doing less.  The first is economic: because of 
structural changes occurring in the profession, our business model is 
unsustainable.250  The second is moral: we are underserving our students by 
permitting them to incur so much educational debt when the education we 
offer does not adequately map onto the workplace they are entering.251  The 
model of three years of generalist training to become an artisan lawyer is no 
longer a realistic or sufficient career preparation for most law graduates.252  
The problem here is not the cost of legal education per se; rather, it is the 
value of legal education as it is currently constructed. 
For the vast majority of law schools, the best solution is to retool.253  
Why?  To ensure the long term viability of our law schools, our students 
need a reliable pathway to high quality professional employment.  Focusing 
only on traditional legal employment is too risky.254  As discussed in Parts 
II.B–C, the number and earning power of these jobs is likely to shrink in the 
years to come.  Some might argue that law schools should become more 
affordable by slashing budgets and increasing teaching loads.255  Although 
this might reduce student debt in the short to medium term, it does 
nothing—zero—to prepare our students for the changes occurring in the 
legal profession and the broader legal industry.256  From my perspective, the 
inadequacy of legal education today is a problem at least on par with its high 
cost.  We need to solve both. 
My own belief is that educational quality is the next great frontier.  If we 
can put a man on the moon in the 1960s, surely with three years and $100K 
we can turn a reasonably able and motivated twenty-four-year-old into a 
critical thinker who can reliably communicate, collaborate, gather facts, 
 250.  See Richard W. Bourne, The Coming Crash in Legal Education: How We Got Here, and 
Where We Go Now, 45 CREIGHTON L. REV. 651, 651–53 (2012) (raising the issue of “whether the 
huge enhancements in legal education in recent years can be sustained”). 
 251.  See id. at 671–85 (discussing the burden of student debt). 
 252.  See id. at 696. 
 253.  This idea was originally discussed in an essay I wrote in a special online series for the 
National Law Journal.  See William D. Henderson, The Hard Business Problems Facing U.S. Law 
Faculty, NAT’L L.J.’S L. SCH. REV. (Oct. 31, 2011, 12:39 PM), 
http://legaltimes.typepad.com/lawschoolreview/2011/10/the-hard-business-problems-facing-us-law-
faculty.html.  
 254.  See id. 
 255.  See Bourne, supra note 250, at 692–93. 
 256.  See id. at 695–96. 
07 HENDERSON SSRN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/13/13  10:17 AM 
[Vol. 40: 461, 2013] A Blueprint for Change 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
505 
assess data, lead, follow, and approach problems with both empathy and 
objectivity.  Improving quality changes the debate from “how much does my 
law degree cost?” to “how much is my law school degree worth?” If the 
worth is sufficiently high, I believe both public and private employers would 
be willing to subsidize it in exchange for preferred access to graduates. 
The only barrier is institutional focus.  To make this happen, a law 
school—or, more likely, a law school consortium—has to take an “Apollo 
Project” approach that focuses purely on education.  After figuring out the 
“how high” and “how fast” possibilities, an institution could then focus on 
controlling costs through process improvements and building modules.  First 
quality (worth), then cost.  This is not trade school education; this is about 
fully exploring human potential.257 
My 12% solution is an “Apollo Project” approach, albeit with a realist’s 
assessment about (a) the complexity of the task before us and (b) how 
quickly an organization can change and remain stable and cohesive.  Law 
schools are filled with highly talented and dedicated professionals who want 
to deliver value to their students.  But not everyone has the energy and 
mindset to begin the iterative process of building a competency-based 
curriculum.  Many of these competencies that a law school might include—
for example, teamwork, communication skills, emotional self-control, 
problem-solving, and decision-making—have to be taught experientially.  
And for most of us law professors, creating and executing these types of 
teaching plans would be a new skill.  Managing student expectations is also 
a problem.  Students, more than anyone, would prefer the legal profession as 
depicted in the popular media.  They expect to learn about torts, contracts 
and constitutional law.  They are unprepared to learn that law is becoming 
less about jury trials and courtroom advocacy and more about process 
engineering, predictive coding, and the collaborative and technical skills 
those processes entail.258 
As a practical matter, I would suggest that we begin with a summer 
institute between the 2L and 3L years of law school that is created and 
staffed by the select group of faculty, alumni, and employers drawn from a 
law school consortium.259  What can be accomplished during a ten-week 
 257.  See William D. Henderson, What is the Answer to High Student Debt?, THE LEGAL 
WHITEBOARD (May 23, 2012), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/legalwhiteboard/2012/05/what-is-
the-answer-to-high-student-debt.html.  
 258.  Richard Susskind recently remarked that, “I talk to many audiences, nearly all of them 
skeptical and conservative.  And consistently, the most conservative audiences are law students.”  
See William D. Henderson, Why Are We Afraid of the Future of Law?, NAT’L JURIST, Sept. 2012, at 
8, 8 (quoting Susskind during a speech given in London in June 2012).  
 259.  There is an immensely practical reason for starting with a summer program that does not 
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summer program for 3L law students is approximately equivalent to 12% of 
learning in law school.  Although the consortium faculty would be charged 
with creating the curriculum, in all likelihood it would be entail simulations, 
team-based projects, and other forms of experiential learning.  The summer 
institute would enable a larger number of law professors to observe these 
new forms of teaching.  If successful, the course materials and assessment 
tools developed by the summer institute would begin migrating back to the 
law school environment to fill 12% of the actual law school curriculum. 
Building and delivering this 12% curriculum will probably require the 
efforts of at least 20% of the law school faculty.  Let us go with the 20% 
who are most willing to accept this challenge—probably many junior 
members of the faculty who realize that riding out the clock is just not an 
option.  The remaining 88% of the curriculum, taught by the remaining 80% 
or so of the faculty carrying a slightly heavier teaching load, can be kept 
largely intact.  This process of building and improving a competency-based 
curriculum will have to unfold over a period of years.  With some early 
successes, the 12% can be expanded to fit the strategic needs of the schools.  
But I would advise a simple maxim: crawl, walk, run. 
The 12% solution is a plan for law faculty to create school-specific 
capital.260  A competency-based curriculum is best executed by the faculty 
who created it and who continue to grow and improve it.261  We will be 
interdependent upon one another to create the new competency-based 
curriculum, and it is this interdependence that will enable us to deliver a 
superior education as compared to other law schools staffed by autonomous 
teachers and scholars.  The price we will pay for this school-specific capital 
is likely to mean substantially less time for traditional legal scholarship—the 
kind that has historically enabled law professors to obtain a more lucrative 
lateral offer at a higher-ranked law school.262 
offer law school credit: the entire program would be outside the purview of ABA Accreditation 
Standards and law school educational policy committees, yet it could nonetheless transform some 
law students into the type of law school graduates that are in short supply.  Again, to be successful, 
this entire blueprint requires validation by the labor markets. 
 260.  The concept of school-specific capital is based on Gilson’s and Mnookin’s discussion of 
firm-specific capital, which is the creation of a resource by partners that can only be profitably 
exploited within the firm and thus is not subject to grabbing and leaving.  See Ronald J. Gilson & 
Robert H. Mnookin, Sharing Among the Human Capitalists: An Economic Inquiry into the 
Corporate Law Firm and How Partners Split Profits, 37 STAN. L. REV. 313, 353–71 (1985) 
(discussing advantages and sources of firm-specific capital); see also William D. Henderson, Law 
Professor Free Agency and “School-Specific” Capital, LEGAL PROF. BLOG (Aug. 13, 2008), 
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/legal_profession/2008/08/law-professor-f.html (discussing the 
effects of increasing professor mobility on school-specific capital).  
 261.  See Gregory S. Munro, Integrating Theory and Practice in a Competency-Based 
Curriculum: Academic Planning at the University of Montana School of Law, 52 MONT. L. REV. 
345, 358–63 (1991). 
 262.  See Gillette, supra note 198, at 215. 
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Ironically, in terms of scholarship, any law school that succeeds in 
creating true school-specific capital would be in a position to make an 
enormous contribution to the literature on experiential legal education, 
educational assessments, adult learning, teamwork, institutional design and 
change management.  That said, I realize that this is not the type of work that 
many law professors signed up for.  If this describes you and your 
colleagues, then you likely have some decisions to make.  If your law school 
embraces a plan that is uncomfortably far away from your vision of legal 
education, think long and hard about whether your preferred vision is 
economically viable.  It may be time to either let go of old ideas or, 
alternatively, to move on to other opportunities. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The day before I completed this manuscript, I had breakfast with Mark 
Chandler, the general counsel of Cisco Systems, Inc, a major publicly traded 
technology company.  I told Mark about the subject of this essay—that I am 
delivering the hard news that the vast majority of law schools either have to 
adapt to the new legal marketplace or go out of business.  I was focused on 
the fear and sadness it might engender for many readers.  He, in contrast, 
focused on the benefits and innovations that these pressures will soon 
produce. “What you are describing is my industry, my job, every day. 
Changes in the way knowledge is collected and accessed are affecting all of 
us.  For everyone but law school deans and professors who refuse to change, 
this sounds like wonderful news.  So don’t worry about it.  Now, what do 
you want for breakfast?” 
This was a welcomed reality check for me.  There is an opportunity 
here; an opportunity to do something great.  I hope you agree. 
 
